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EXECUTIVE UNILATERALISM AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN A FEDERALIST SYSTEM

Meredith McLain* and Sharece Thrower**

ABSTRACT
Presidents have a wide array of tools at their disposal to unilaterally influence
public policy, without the direct approval of Congress or the courts. These unilateral
actions have the potential to affect a variety of individual rights, either profitably or
adversely. Governors too can employ unilateral directives for similar purposes, often
impacting an even wider range of rights. In this Article, we collect all executive
orders and memoranda related to individual rights issued between 1981 and 2018
at the federal level, and across the U.S. states, to analyze their use over time. We find
that chief executives of all kinds are more likely to issue unilateral directives that
expand individual rights if they are Democratic or liberal and when there is a public
appetite for rights advancement. Furthermore, governors issue more rights-related
directives when they view Presidents as likely to be restrictive or inactive on individual rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Though political observers and stakeholders lauded the Obama administration
for its unprecedented advancements for transgender rights,1 President Trump steadily
worked to reverse these policies during his tenure in office.2 Obama issued executive
actions broadening antidiscrimination protections of transgender persons in areas
spanning employment, housing, and health care.3 Trump, on the other hand, subsequently ordered his agencies to propose new rules curtailing rights in these same areas.4
For instance, he reinstituted a ban on transgender individuals serving in the military.5
In denouncing the Obama administration’s policy, Trump’s 2017 memorandum stated:
Until June 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) . . . generally prohibited
openly transgender individuals from accession into the United
States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.
Shortly before President Obama left office, however, his Administration dismantled the Departments’ established framework by
permitting transgender individuals to serve openly in the military,
1
Sue Fulton, President of the LGBT rights group Service Members, Partners, Allies for
Respect and Tolerance for All, said in 2016 that “[t]he Obama administration will go down in
history as one of the most significant for LGBT Americans.” Emma Margolin, With Transgender Military Ban Lifted, Obama Cements Historic LGBT Rights Legacy, NBCNEWS, https://
www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/transgender-military-ban-lifted-obama-cements-historic
-lgbt-rights-legacy-n600541 [https://perma.cc/VE3C-667K] (June 30, 2016, 2:45 PM).
2
See Selena Simmons-Duffin, ‘Whiplash’ of LGBTQ Protections and Rights from Obama
to Trump, NPR (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/02/80487
3211/whiplash-of-lgbtq-protections-and-rights-from-obama-to-trump [https://perma.cc
/A4US-NRNX].
3
See Fact Sheet: Obama Administration’s Record and the LGBT Community, WHITE
HOUSE: OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (June 9, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press
-office/2016/06/09/fact-sheet-obama-administrations-record-and-lgbt-community [https://
perma.cc/8NTK-LSCX].
4
See Simmons-Duffin, supra note 2.
5
Adam Edelman, Trump Bans Transgender People Serving in the Military, NBCNEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-announces-ban-transgender-people
-serving-military-n786621 [https://perma.cc/B8XB-NPJM] (July 26, 2017, 5:15 PM).
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authorizing the use of the Departments’ resources to fund sexreassignment surgical procedures, and permitting accession of
such individuals after July 1, 2017. . . .
....
I am directing the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, to return
to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 . . . .6
Such tit-for-tat executive policymaking over individual rights was not an
isolated incident: in the same year, the Trump administration reversed Obama-era
guidelines that allowed transgender students to use restroom facilities of their
choice.7 In announcing this change, the White House stated that “policy regarding
transgender bathrooms should be decided at the state level.”8 Accordingly, many
governors assumed the mantle of protecting transgender rights in their states through
unilateral directives.9
Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy signed a pair of executive orders in 2017, in
direct response to these federal restrictions.10 One order reaffirmed state non-discrimination policies based on sexual identity in public facilities, while asking the Department of Education to develop guidance “that allow[ed] student’s access to school
facilities in a manner consistent with a student’s gender identity or expression.”11 A
few months later, Malloy signed another order mandating that the Connecticut military
prohibit policy or action “that discriminates against service members in enlistments,
promotion, or any other aspect of their service, on the basis of their gender identity
6

Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY COMP.PRES.
DOC. 587 (Aug. 25, 2017).
7
Faith Karimi & Emanuella Grinberg, Trump’s Reversal on Transgender Bathroom
Directive: How We Got Here, CNN (Feb. 23, 2017, 8:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017
/02/23/health/transgender-bathrooms-trump-q-and-a/index.html [https://perma.cc/AZX6-AX54].
8
Id.
9
See Kathleen Megan, Malloy Signs Executive Order to Strengthen Protection of Transgender Students, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 24, 2017, 10:07 AM), https://www.courant.com
/education/hc-trump-transgender-bathrooms-20170223-story.html [https://perma.cc/QBK7
-XBTX]; Caroline Cournoyer, Amid LGBT Bathroom Debate, Virginia Governor Orders
State Contractors Not to Discriminate, GOVERNING (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.govern
ing.com/topics/mgmt/Virginia-Governor.html [https://perma.cc/K29W-BUZQ]; Anne Blythe
& Abbie Bennett, Cooper: ‘Transgender People Are Not Prevented from the Use of Public
Facilities,’ NEWS & OBSERVER, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government
/state-politics/article179565026.html [https://perma.cc/8VH7-2NP3] (Oct. 19, 2017, 11:49 AM).
10
See Conn. Exec. Order No. 56 (Feb. 23, 2017), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of
-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Others/Governor-Dannel-P-Malloy--Executive-Order-No
-56.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFN5-LGPB]; Conn. Exec. Order No. 60 (July 26, 2017), https://
portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Others/Governor-Dannel-P
-Malloy--Executive-Order-No-60.pdf [https://perma.cc/786K-VX8G].
11
Conn. Exec. Order No. 56, supra note 10.
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or expression.”12 In Virginia, Terry McAuliffe likewise issued an executive order in
2017 that extended non-discrimination policies in state employment to include
gender identity and sexual orientation.13 Roy Cooper penned a similar order in North
Carolina.14 Despite these governors being proactive in expanding transgender rights,
some have remained silent on the matter.15 Based on these noticeable state-to-state
differences, Eliza Byard, from the Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network, insightfully espoused the view that “no child in America should have their rights subject
to their ZIP code.”16
Altogether, these episodes demonstrate the power of chief executives—both
Presidents and governors alike—to unilaterally influence individual rights. Since
unilateral directives, like executive orders, are viewed as having the force of law in
a variety of contexts, they serve as potentially potent vehicles for change.17 So why
do some Presidents and governors use unilateral actions to advance individual rights,
while others pursue more dormant or restrictive paths? Are there any consistent,
systematic differences between how members of different parties utilize these tools?
The remainder of this Article seeks to answer this question.
To do so, we first present background information on unilateral directives at
both the federal (Part I) and state (Part II) levels. Presidents commonly use both
executive orders and memoranda to instruct agencies on policy implementation.18
Though the former has the force of law, Presidents since Reagan have used both
tools to systematically advance their policy goals and augment executive power.19
Governors likewise have a variety of unilateral tools at their disposal, but executive
orders are uniformly wielded across the fifty states for similar purposes.20 In Parts I
and II, we define these unilateral powers, describe their functions and constitutional
12

Conn. Exec. Order No. 60, supra note 10.
Va. Exec. Order No. 61 (Jan. 5, 2017), http://digitool1.lva.lib.va.us:1801/webclient
/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1608519913904~690 [https://perma.cc/M54E-6H6E].
14
N.C. Exec. Order No. 24 (Oct. 18, 2017), https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents
/files/EO24-Policies%20Prohibiting%20DiscriminationHarassment%26Retaliation%20in
%20State%20EmploymentServicesContracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP4S-Q5YQ].
15
See, e.g., Gov. LePage Stops Rules for Protecting Transgender Students, NEWS CTR.
ME. (Feb. 5, 2016, 5:28 AM), https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/local/gov-lepage
-stops-rules-for-protecting-transgender-students/97-35316200 [https://perma.cc/FVB2-442G].
16
Carrie Johnson, What’s Next for Transgender Rights Lawsuits with School Guidance
Rescinded, NPR (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/23/516858583/whats-next-for
-transgender-rights-lawsuits-with-school-guidance-rescinded [https://perma.cc/B8UB-3KFR].
17
William G. Howell, Introduction: Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 417, 426 (2005).
18
See id. at 417; PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE
OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 59–61 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the use of the executive order
as a tool for controlling agency policymaking).
19
See COOPER, supra note 18, at 116–19.
20
See Margaret R. Ferguson & Cynthia J. Bowling, Executive Orders and Administrative
Control, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S20, S27 (2008).
13
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origins, and provide examples of how they have been historically used to influence
individual rights.21
Part III then considers what factors might influence the use of unilateral directives related to individual rights.22 We survey the extensive literature on presidential
unilateralism to develop theoretical expectations on when chief executives should
employ these directives based on various political factors. We expect Presidents and
governors who are from the Democratic Party (and who are liberal) to issue more
rights-related directives, given this party’s stance on protecting marginalized groups.
Based on ideas of descriptive representation, we also expect female and minority
executives to actively protect rights through unilateral actions. We go on to argue
that chief executives should be better positioned to employ these directives when
there is greater public support for themselves and for advancing rights. Finally, as
the opening examples suggest, we expect to observe the dynamics of federalism in
this context. That is, governors should be particularly driven to unilaterally protect
individual rights when Presidents are poised to promote restrictive or inactive
policies. Conversely, less unilateral action is needed in the states if the current
President stands to promote rights across the nation.
We test these expectations by examining presidential executive orders and memoranda in Part IV and gubernatorial executive orders in Part V. We collect and categorize all such unilateral directives issued between 1981 and 2018, based on eleven
different individual rights categories. We present descriptive data and use regression
analyses to evaluate our theory-driven expectations. Liberal and Democratic chief
executives across the federalist system issue more unilateral directives related to
individual rights—as we expected.23 Higher public approval, particularly from liberals
and moderates, also corresponds to a greater reliance on rights-related directives.24
Contrary to expectations, public conservatism actually appears to motivate executives to take more care in unilaterally protecting rights, when these rights are perhaps
most vulnerable.25 We find little evidence, however, that women and non-white
governors are active champions of individual rights through unilateral means.26
In the specific area of civil rights, public salience and positive feelings towards
African Americans appear to be important drivers of unilateral activity.27 Negative
feelings towards women and the gay community, on the other hand, can incentivize
greater protections.28 Lastly, governors tend to issue more executive orders advancing civil rights when a Republican or conservative President is in the White House,
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

See infra Parts I, II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Sections IV.B, V.B.
See infra Sections IV.B, V.B.
See infra Sections IV.B, V.B.
See infra Section V.B.
See infra Sections IV.B, V.B.
See infra Sections IV.B, V.B.
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particularly when the issue is salient.29 Thus, these state officials seemingly rise to
the call to guard individual rights when these rights are the most vulnerable to hostile
or inactive federal policies.30 We conclude by summarizing these findings while also
discussing the broader implications of individual rights and executive unilateralism
in our separation of powers system.31
I. BACKGROUND ON PRESIDENTIAL UNILATERAL DIRECTIVES
We begin our exploration with presidential power. In this Part, we introduce the
concept of executive unilateralism and discuss its origins from the U.S. Constitution.32
We then describe two of the most prominent unilateral tools in the President’s arsenal:
executive orders and memoranda. We define these powers, detail their functions,
and give examples of their use in the realm of individual rights over time.
A. Constitutional Origins of Unilateral Power
Scholars generally classify Presidents as having two types of powers at their disposal: formal and informal powers.33 The former is rooted in the Constitution and the
latter is not.34 Instead, informal powers are based on individual characteristics, like bargaining and management styles, or by nature of the office, such as Presidents’ visibility
and public appeals.35 While some scholars advocate that informal sources are the most
important for presidential prerogatives,36 recent and resurgent scholarly attention has
elevated formal powers to the fore.37 These powers come in two main varieties: explicit and inherent powers.38 Many have long been aware of those presidential powers
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, including the ability to veto laws, appoint
individuals to the bureaucracy and bench, make treaties, and grant pardons.39 Powers
inherently derived from ambiguous constitutional language, however, have become
increasingly important for augmenting presidential authority over time.40
29

See infra Section V.B.
See infra Section V.B.
31
See infra Conclusion.
32
See generally U.S. CONST. art. II (laying out the powers of the presidency).
33
See, e.g., RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP
10 (1960) (distinguishing Presidents’ formal powers from their powers of persuasion).
34
See id.
35
See Howell, supra note 17, at 420–21 (describing the presidential power to bargain,
negotiate, and convince).
36
See, e.g., NEUSTADT, supra note 33, at 10 (“[D]espite [the President’s] status he does
not get action without argument. Presidential power is the power to persuade.”).
37
See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power:
A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 850–51 (1999).
38
See Louis Fisher, Holding the President Accountable to Constitutional Limits, 2014
UTAH L. REV. 793, 793–97.
39
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; id. art I, § 2.
40
See Moe & Howell, supra note 37, at 854–56.
30
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Notably, the unitary executive theory advances Presidents’ reliance on inherent
powers.41 Based on constitutional provisions stating “executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States,”42 as well as that Presidents shall “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution”43 and “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”44 the unitary executive theory advocates that Presidents have sole control
over the executive branch and the ability to independently interpret the Constitution.45
Presidents have used this theory to justify a myriad of controversial actions, including
the removal of executive branch officials, centralizing control over agency activities,
and signing statements. Though some argue that the unitary executive originated at the
Constitutional Convention,46 others purport Reagan as being the first President to
systematically embrace this theory as a justification for a variety of these actions,47
notably unilateral actions.
Unilateral powers are distinct from other tools of the presidency because they
allow Presidents to act first and act alone.48 Such unique features afford them opportunities to influence public policies without the explicit approval from the other
branches of government.49 Presidents can set the agenda with these actions, thereby
placing the burden of response elsewhere.50 Congress, plagued with collective action
problems, and the courts, who must wait for affected parties to bring suit, both can
face difficulties when directly responding to unilateral action.51 Studies of unilateralism
generally focus on unilateral directives, or written statements directing executive
branch agencies in policy implementation.52 We follow suit. Executive orders and
memoranda are the two primary vehicles by which Presidents formally command
agencies—as reviewed below.

41

STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDEN3–4 (2008).
42
U.S. CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 1.
43
Id. art. II § 1, cl. 8.
44
Id. art. II § 3, cl. 5.
45
See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see
also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 41, at 3 (Hamilton commenting on how many at the time
believed the executive being one who needed “energy”).
46
See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 41, at 3.
47
Ryan J. Barilleaux & Christopher S. Kelley, Introduction: What Is the Unitary Executive?,
in THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 1, 2 (Ryan J. Barilleaux &
Christopher S. Kelley eds., 2010).
48
See Howell, supra note 17, at 421.
49
See id. at 418–19.
50
See id. at 425–26.
51
See Moe & Howell, supra note 37, at 858.
52
See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 41, at 28 (stating that the authors’ examination
of historical unilateralism is limited to “veto messages, signing statements, legislative proposals, and statements regarding previously enacted legislation”).
TIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH
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B. Presidential Executive Orders
Executive orders are written directives issued by Presidents providing instructions to executive branch agencies and officials on how to implement or interpret the
law.53 They are generally viewed by the courts as having the force of law, as long
as they do not explicitly violate statutes or the Constitution.54 Following the passage
of the Federal Register Act of 1936, all executive orders must be published in the
Federal Register.55 Dating back to George Washington, Presidents have used them
for an array of purposes,56 including to form, abolish, or restructure agencies,57 delegate
authority,58 create policy initiatives,59 respond to economic or foreign crises,60 initiate
or guide rulemaking,61 manage public lands,62 coordinate agency activity,63 and
govern civil service personnel64 and policies.65 Executive orders are often utilized
by Presidents to pursue policies that are salient to them, certain constituencies, or
the general public.66
53

JOHN CONTRUBIS,
CLAMATIONS 1 (1999).
54

CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL95-722A, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRO-

See COOPER, supra note 18, at 70.
Federal Register Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-220, § 5, 49 Stat. 500, 501 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. § 1505).
56
See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Executive Orders, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/323876 [https://perma.cc/3CXE-B2FA] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2021); N.J. HIST. RECS. SURV. PROJECT, LIST AND INDEX OF PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE
ORDERS: UNNUMBERED SERIES, 1789–1941, at 1–2 (Clifford L. Lord ed., 1943) (collecting
presidential actions arguably considered executive orders today)
57
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001) (establishing the
Department of Homeland Security).
58
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,108, 28 Fed. Reg. 5,183 (May 22, 1963) (delegating
authority to the Secretary of Agriculture).
59
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,271 (Mar. 16, 2009) (developing
policy for education of girls and women in technical fields).
60
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,235, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,343 (Nov. 16, 2001) (emergency
response to the World Trade Center attacks).
61
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 4, 1993) (requiring costbenefit analysis for government regulations).
62
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,996, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,647 (Mar. 25, 1996) (managing the
National Wildlife Refuge System).
63
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,937, 85 Fed. Reg. 45,755 (July 24, 2020) (coordinating
actions of the Department of Health and Human Services grant program for affordable
insulin and epinephrine medication).
64
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,832, 83 Fed. Reg. 22,343 (May 9, 2018) (prioritizing
hiring of military spouses in civil service).
65
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,056, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,017 (Oct. 11, 1962) (assigning
certain permissions to federal salary determinations).
66
See What Is an Executive Order?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/what-is-an-executive
-order-/ [https://perma.cc/G3BP-W3UD].
55
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To that end, Presidents have employed these orders to engage with individual
rights. They are commonly adopted to create agencies,67 councils, or task forces
promoting diversity or economic opportunity for certain groups of individuals.68 For
instance, President Obama issued an executive order establishing the White House
Council on Women and Girls to “increase the participation of women in the science,
engineering, and technology workforce” and “to address issues of special importance to women and girls.”69 In another order, he acknowledged the historical mistreatment of Native Americans and thereafter created the White House Council on
Native American Affairs, designed “to support tribal self-governance” and “increase
the impact of Federal resources and create greater opportunities to help improve the
quality of life for Native Americans.”70 Presidents have likewise promoted policy
initiatives through unilateral directives for similar purposes.71 President Clinton, for
instance, issued an executive order to expand employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities.72 Every President since Carter has signed an executive order
advancing Historically Black Colleges and Universities.73
Patterns of unilateral activity in other rights-related realms have also transcended presidencies. Franklin D. Roosevelt first issued an executive order prohibiting discrimination in federal defense agencies and contractors on the basis of “race,
creed, color, or national origin” and created the Committee on Fair Employment
Practice to enforce it.74 This policy was expanded under Truman and Eisenhower to
include all federal contractors, with greater enforcement.75 Similar non-discrimination orders were accompanied by requirements for federal contractors to promote
affirmative action hiring under Kennedy, who likewise established the President’s
67

See William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL.
1095, 1101–02 (2002) (noting that Presidents often create agencies when Congress cannot).
68
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109 (June 27, 1941) (creating the Fair
Employment Practices Commission to target racial discrimination); Exec. Order No. 13,647,
78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (July 1, 2013) (creating the White House Council on Native American
Affairs); Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,271 (Mar. 16, 2009).
69
See Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74 Fed. Reg. at 11,272.
70
Exec. Order No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,541.
71
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,163, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,563 (July 28, 2000).
72
Id.
73
See Exec. Order No. 12,232, 45 Fed. Reg. 53,437 (Aug. 12, 1980) (President Carter);
Exec. Order No. 12,320, 46 Fed. Reg. 46,107 (Sept. 17, 1981) (President Reagan); Exec.
Order No. 12,677, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,869 (April 28, 1989) (President George H.W. Bush);
Exec. Order No. 12,876, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,735 (Nov. 4, 1993) (President Clinton); Exec.
Order No. 13,256, 67 Fed. Reg. 6,823 (Feb. 14, 2002) (President George W. Bush); Exec.
Order No. 13,532, 75 Fed. Reg. 9,749 (Mar. 3, 2010) (President Obama); Exec. Order No.
13,779, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,499 (Mar. 3, 2017) (President Trump).
74
Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109, 3,109 (June 27, 1941).
75
Exec. Order No. 10,308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Dec. 3, 1951); Exec. Order No. 10,479,
18 Fed. Reg. 4,899, 4,899, 4,901 (Aug. 18, 1953).
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Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.76 Lyndon B. Johnson transferred the
responsibility for enforcing these non-discrimination and affirmative action policies
to the Secretary of Labor, while also expanding coverage to sex.77 George W. Bush
broadened protections to encompass faith-based and community organizations,78
while Obama included sexual orientation.79
Not all executive orders related to individual rights are used to expand them,
however. While some Presidents, like Kennedy and Obama, established collective bargaining rights for federal employees through executive order,80 others such as Carter,
Reagan, and George H.W. Bush issued exemptions limiting these rights.81 Relatedly,
Trump completely revoked Obama’s order creating additional labor-management
forums.82 Overall, executive orders can expand or contract individual rights. However, they are not the only means by which Presidents can unilaterally affect rights.
C. Presidential Memoranda
Like executive orders, memoranda are presidential directives providing agency
instruction.83 They have been used by Presidents since Lincoln, for similar purposes
as those for executive orders stated above.84 Unlike executive orders, however,
memoranda are not required to be published in the Federal Register.85 They consequently are not always readily accessible for public record.86 Furthermore, the legal
status of memoranda is ambiguous at best.87 The courts have not explicitly ruled that
these directives have the force of law, as they have done for executive orders.88 Though
76

Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (Mar. 8, 1961).
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965); Exec. Order No.
11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 13, 1967).
78
Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 16, 2002).
79
Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014).
80
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962); Exec. Order No.
13,522, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,203 (Dec. 14, 2009).
81
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,171, 44 Fed. Reg. 66,565 (Nov. 19, 1979) (President
Carter exempting agencies from newly passed federal employee rules); William C. Zifchak,
Collective Bargaining in the Reagan Era: A Management Perspective, 1 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1983) (discussing President Reagan’s laissez-faire approach to collective
bargaining); Exec. Order No. 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (Oct. 23, 1992) (President H.W.
Bush allowing government contractors to opt out of joining unions).
82
Exec. Order No. 13,812, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,367 (Oct. 4, 2017).
83
See COOPER, supra note 18, at 135–38.
84
See, e.g., Memorandum to General George B. McClellan on Potomac Campaign (Dec. 1,
1861), reprinted in 5 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 34–35 (Roy P. Basler,
Marion Dolores Pratt & Lloyd A. Dunlap eds., 1953) (discussing military strategy).
85
COOPER, supra note 18, at 122–23.
86
Id. at 123 (noting that some Presidents have published some of their memoranda, but
there is no formal system for disseminating them or organizing them).
87
See id. at 121, 156.
88
See id. at 157–58.
77
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their legal implications may be less clear, memoranda are still frequently used to advance and retract individual rights.
For instance, Reagan issued a memorandum promoting initiatives related to
Historically Black Colleges and Universities.89 Clinton signed several memoranda
on employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities.90 Obama created a
Working Group on the Intersection of HIV/AIDS, Violence Against Women and
Girls, and Gender-Related Health Disparities.91 Presidents often use executive orders
and memoranda interchangeably, both in name and in practice.92 Memoranda are
sometimes employed in conjunction with executive orders, allowing the President
to simultaneously pursue policy change in a variety of ways. Obama, for example,
signed in the same year an executive order advancing fair pay for federal contractors93
and a memorandum requesting the Department of Labor to propose a rule requiring
contractors to provide data on employee compensation.94
Memoranda have been utilized much more regularly to engage with other types
of individual rights. Presidents, like Clinton and Obama, provided relief to immigrants,95 while others, notably Trump, restricted immigration and deprived protections
for undocumented individuals.96 Obama issued a memorandum advancing the human
rights of LGBTQ individuals abroad through foreign assistance, immigration policies,
and the United States’ responses to international violations.97 Trump, on the other
89
See Memorandum on Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 2 PUB. PAPERS 871
(July 24, 1987).
90
See, e.g., Memorandum on Renewing the Commitment to Ensure that Federal Programs
Are Free from Disability-Based Discrimination, 2 PUB.PAPERS 1467 (July 26, 2000); Memorandum on Employing People with Significant Disabilities to Fill Federal Agency Jobs that Can Be
Performed at Alternate Work Sites, Including the Home, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1468 (July 26, 2000).
91
See Memorandum on Establishing a Working Group on the Intersection of HIV/AIDS,
Violence Against Women and Girls, and Gender-Related Health Disparities, 1 PUB. PAPERS
20,277 (Mar. 30, 2012).
92
COOPER, supra note 18, at 120, 131–32.
93
Exec. Order No. 13,673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,309 (July 31, 2014).
94
Memorandum on Advancing Pay Equality Through Compensation Data Collection,
1 PUB. PAPERS 20,751 (Apr. 8, 2014).
95
See, e.g., Memorandum on the Eligibility of Aliens for Food Stamps, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1331 (Aug. 22, 1996) (ensuring that alien immigrants would continue to receive food stamps
during pending eligibility determinations); Memorandum on the Response to the Influx of
Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest Border, 1 PUB. PAPERS 635 (June 2,
2014) (advocating for unified effort to ensure housing and medical care would be provided
to unaccompanied child immigrants).
96
See, e.g., Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance Border Security and Restore
Integrity to Our Immigration System, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Apr. 29, 2019) (proposing regulations establishing a fee for asylum applications and barring asylum seekers from
receiving employment authorization prior to granting of approval).
97
Memorandum on International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1524 (Dec. 6, 2011).
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hand, banned transgender persons from military service.98 Memoranda have likewise
been used to influence other areas of individual rights related to fair housing,99 affirmative action,100 religious expression,101 victims’ rights,102 and environmental justice.103
II. BACKGROUND ON GUBERNATORIAL UNILATERAL DIRECTIVES
The President is not the only executive with the power to unilaterally influence
public policy. Governors, too, use unilateral actions, most notably executive orders,
in a wide range of areas that include individual rights.104 In this Part we provide
details on gubernatorial executive orders by first tracing their origins from state
constitutions. We then describe their functions and provide examples of how they
have been used to influence citizens’ rights. Along the way, we highlight differences
in this power across states and make comparisons to the federal level.
A. Constitutional Origins of Gubernatorial Power and Unilateralism
Like the federal level, state constitutions establish separation of powers systems
with distinct bases of power, divided amongst three branches of government. Early
governors were weak relative to their legislative counterparts, given the general
distrust of executive power by states traumatized by their colonial pasts.105 By the
98

Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY COMP.PRES.
DOC. 1 (Aug. 25, 2017).
99
See, e.g., Memorandum on the Civil Rights Working Group, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1430
(Aug. 4, 1994) (creating a Civil Rights Working Group to supplement the previously created
Fair Housing Council).
100
See, e.g., Memorandum on Affirmative Action, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1114 (July 19, 1995)
(calling for an update to affirmative action protocol to accommodate requirements laid out
by the Supreme Court).
101
See, e.g., Memorandum on Religious Expression in Public Schools, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1083 (July 12, 1995) (reiterating what religious activities individual students may engage in
while at school, including non-disruptive prayer, reading their Bible while not receiving
instruction, and attending after-school events).
102
See, e.g., Memorandum for the Director of the Office of Personnel Management on
Guidebook for Victims of Domestic Violence, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1978 (Nov. 4, 1998) (directing
the preparation of a guidebook for federal agencies detailing response strategies for departments
and providing resources for federal employees who were victims of domestic violence).
103
See, e.g., Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 1 PUB. PAPERS 241 (Feb. 11, 1994)
(directing agencies that receive federal funding to adhere to nonracially discriminatory
practices, requiring federal agencies to conduct analysis of their actions on minority and lowincome communities, and requiring a community comment period for all actions involving
National Environmental Policy Act assessments).
104
See infra Section II.B.
105
Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 493 (2017).
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turn of the twentieth century, however, the power dynamics shifted.106 States began
granting governors more expansive powers, in response to growing dissatisfaction
with legislatures and rampant corruption.107 Though their power varies from state to
state, many governors have similar policymaking abilities as the President. Gubernatorial powers are generally separated into formal and informal tools, the latter of which
is attributed to their increasing prominence in state and national politics.108 In the case
of the former, state constitutions grant governors many familiar tools, such as traditional vetoes and appointments, as well as some not granted to the President, like the
line-item veto.109
Governors have likewise embraced unilateral powers but to varying degrees.
Some use proclamations in similar ways as the President, for general pronouncements of policy.110 Others wield them for alternative tasks such as to declare disaster
emergencies111 or to designate the agenda of legislative sessions.112 In some states,
governors rely extensively on administrative orders to manage the executive branch.113
Though not every governor deploys proclamations or administrative orders, every
single one of them has the power to issue executive orders.114
Like the President, some governors—like those in California, Connecticut, and
Maine—derive this authority implicitly from constitutional clauses endowing executive
power broadly or from their own version of the Take Care Clause.115 Unlike the
106

Id. at 496–97.
Id. at 496.
108
E. Lee Bernick, Gubernatorial Tools: Formal vs. Informal, 41 J.POL. 656, 657–58 (1979).
109
See Seifter, supra note 105, at 499.
110
See, e.g., Jim Justice, Proclamation Declaring Christmas Eve as Full-Day State Holiday
for Public Employees (Dec. 10, 2019), https://governor.wv.gov/Documents/2019%20Procla
mations/2019-Holiday-Proclamation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y5A-PS4K] (establishing one-time
work policy).
111
See, e.g., Greg Abbott, Disaster Proclamation Issued for 30 Texas Counties in Anticipation of Tropical Depression Harvey Making Landfall (Aug. 23, 2017), https://gov.texas.gov
/news/post/Disaster-Proclamation-Issued-For-30-Texas-Counties-in-Anticipation-Of-Tropi
cal-Depression-Harvey-Making-Landfall [https://perma.cc/952G-JD4D].
112
See, e.g., Neb. Exec. Order No. 17-04 (July 6, 2017), http://govdocs.nebraska.gov/docs
/pilot/pubs/eofiles/17-04.pdf (asking the legislature to consider paring down the Nebraska
Administrative Code from 7,500,000 words by eliminating redundant language).
113
Compare Archives for Admin Orders, OFF. GOV. MIKE DUNLEAVY, https://gov.alaska
.gov/admin-orders/ [https://perma.cc/EFT5-KGSE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (listing approximately forty administrative orders issued since 2016), with Executive Orders of the 29th
Legislature, ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Law/EO/29 [https://
perma.cc/MYF7-UHPT] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (showing Executive Order 118, issued
in January 2016, as the most recent of its type).
114
Heather Perkins, State Executive Branch, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2019, at 102,
112 tbl.4.5 (2019), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/4.5.2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7RC2-S8P3].
115
See Regarding Executive Order B-54-79, 63 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 583 (1980); CONN.
CONST. art. IV, § 12; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. I, §§ 1, 12; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
107
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President, however, some state constitutions explicitly grant governors the power to issue executive orders for specific purposes like disaster declarations,116 reorganization,117
or calling special sessions.118 Some state legislatures have likewise passed statutes
explicitly authorizing gubernatorial executive orders for limited purposes, such as
disaster declarations and other emergency powers in Indiana.119 In Louisiana, governors are granted general and broad authority to issue an executive order through a
statute stating: “The authority of the governor to see that the laws are faithfully
executed by issuing executive orders is recognized.”120
Akin to orders on the federal level, gubernatorial executive orders are viewed
as having the force of law by some state courts, such as in South Carolina.121 Many
other judiciaries have acknowledged the legal authority of executive orders in a
more limited manner, by qualifying its force of law in the cases of only implementing a specific statute, when authorized by statute or the constitution,122 or on matters
related to the executive branch.123
B. Functions of Gubernatorial Executive Orders
Regardless of these differences, all state governors regularly use executive orders
for administrative and policy purposes. Governors, like Presidents, can specifically
employ orders in ways that impact individual rights. Many of these orders are used
to create commissions, task forces, and committees on issues related to diversity and
economic or employment opportunities. For example, Jim Folsom Jr. in Alabama
created the Governor’s Office of Minority Affairs in 1994.124 Arizona Governor Fife
Symington issued a string of executive orders in 1993 that established committees
on the Employment of People with Disabilities, Non-traditional Employment for
Women, and Violence Against Women as well as the Office of Americans with
Disabilities to help implement the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).125
116

E.g., COLO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, cl. 2.
MD. CONST. art. II, § 24.
118
Id. art. II, § 16.
119
E.g., IND. CODE § 10-14-3-13 (2020).
120
LA. STAT. ANN. § 49:215 (2020).
121
See Drummond v. Beasley, 503 S.E.2d 455, 458 (S.C. 1998) (implying that executive
orders do carry the force of law in asserting that a veto message did not because it was not issued
as an executive order).
122
See, e.g., Werner v. Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331, 1336 (Pa. 1996).
123
See Kilpatrick v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 356 P.3d 1008, 1015–16 (Colo. App. 2015).
124
Ala. Exec. Order No. 25 (Aug. 8, 1994), https://digital.archives.alabama.gov/digital/col
lection/executive/id/346/rec/28 [https://perma.cc/JSS8-4869].
125
Ariz. Exec. Order No. 93-12 (July 7, 1993), https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital
/collection/execorders/id/2029/rec/11 [https://perma.cc/F3GD-UX87]; Ariz. Exec. Order No.
93-13 (July 1, 1993), https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/execorders/id/2030
/rec/11 [https://perma.cc/SB6U-5FDL]; Ariz. Exec. Order No. 93-14 (July 10, 1993), https://
azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/execorders/id/2031/rec/11 [https://perma.cc/57UX
117
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Other states, such as Washington and Minnesota, likewise issued executive orders
to enforce the ADA.126
Governors commonly issue executive orders on non-discrimination in state
employment and contractors. Similar to the federal level, they often call for nondiscrimination “based on race, color, age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion,
creed, ancestry, national origin, disability, veteran’s status (including Vietnam-era
veterans), or background,” and affirmative action, as Deval Patrick of Massachusetts
did in his 2007 order.127 State executive orders have also covered a wider assortment
of rights than federal ones. For instance, the Kansas governor signed an order establishing a Bill of Rights for Veteran Employment,128 while Massachusetts established
an affirmative action program for Veterans.129 In 2018, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo promulgated executive orders establishing a process for restoring voting rights
to formerly incarcerated individuals,130 specifying privacy policies for state employees,131 and calling for regulations to ensure female employees have access to contraceptive services.132 Illinois Governor Pat Quinn advanced orders on pregnancy
discrimination and freedom of speech protections for state employees in 2015.133
Furthermore, some governors use executive orders to promote victims’ rights, as
did New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson when he created an alliance to evaluate the
delivery of services to victims by state and local agencies and make recommendations
to improve the protection of victim rights in the state.134 Other common areas of
-A7V2]; Ariz. Exec. Order No. 93-19 (Oct. 1, 1993), https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital
/collection/execorders/id/2036/rec/11 [https://perma.cc/4PTJ-BCEL].
126
Wash. Exec. Order No. 93-03 (Feb. 24, 1993), https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites
/default/files/exe_order/eo_93-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8XS-YVKK]; Wash. Exec. Order
No 93-04 (Apr. 30, 1993), https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/exe_order/eo_93
-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EEN-B7RB]; Minn. Exec. Order No. 96-9 (June 12, 1996), https://
www.leg.mn.gov/archive/execorders/96-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BTQ-4WBT].
127
Mass. Exec. Order No. 478 (Jan. 30, 2007), https://www.mass.gov/doc/executive-order
-478-mass-register-1072/download [https://perma.cc/84HD-7R8T].
128
Kan. Exec. Order No. 90-126 (Aug. 23, 1990), https://kslib.info/DocumentCenter/View
/622/EO-90-126?bidId= [https://perma.cc/CGS4-YLPP].
129
Mass. Exec. Order No. 236 (Dec. 7, 1983), https://www.mass.gov/executive-orders/no
-236-the-governors-advisory-council-for-the-state-office-of-affirmative-action [https://perma
.cc/JN7H-CBDU].
130
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/gover
nor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/Executive_Order_181.pdf [https://perma.cc/94GS-V2LG].
131
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 183 (June 27, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/gover
nor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_%23183.pdf [https://perma.cc/G96J-P7SJ].
132
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 184 (July 9, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor
.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_%23184.pdf [https://perma.cc/L32T-TPMH].
133
Ill. Exec. Order No. 15-03 (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www2.illinois.gov/Documents/Exec
Orders/2015/execorder2015-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN88-B3N8]; Ill. Exec. Order No. 15-13
(Feb. 9, 2015), https://www2.illinois.gov/Documents/ExecOrders/2015/ExecutiveOrder2015
-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY5D-7CW8].
134
New Mexico Victim Rights Alliance, DWI RES. CTR., https://dwiresourcecenter.org/in
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rights-related unilateral action in the states include: protections for the disabled,135
the creation of Martin Luther King Jr. federal holiday commissions or task forces,136
anti-ageist guidelines,137 the prevention of sexual harassment,138 and other workplace
policies related to health and safety,139 pay equity,140 and collective bargaining.141
Like Presidents, governors can also utilize executive orders to retract or narrow
individual rights. For instance, Alabama Governor Fob James ordered state agencies
not to grant same-sex marriage licenses in 1996.142 Jan Brewer in Arizona penned several executive orders restricting immigration and immigrant rights during her tenure
in office.143 In 2015, Bobby Jindal issued an executive order to enforce a Louisiana
law punishing those who disturb the peace at funerals.144 Most state executive orders
affecting individual rights, however, expand rather than contract them. Recent
gubernatorial unilateral activity in this area has centered around the rights of trans
individuals145 and immigrants,146 as well as expansions of voting rights.147
III. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS AND MODEL PREDICTIONS
As Part I and Part II illustrate, both Presidents and governors use unilateral directives to influence individual rights—mostly to expand these rights but sometimes to
restrict them as well.148 What, then, determines when chief executives rely more or
dex.php/click-here-to-read-the-victims-rights-alliance-report/ [https://perma.cc/JTE9-MKPU]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
135
See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
136
E.g., Mass. Exec. Order No. 297 (Jan. 18, 1991), https://www.mass.gov/executive-orders
/no-297-martin-luther-king-jr-holiday-commission [https://perma.cc/A7Y6-B46D].
137
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.96 (1987).
138
Wash. Exec. Order. No. 89-01 (Jan. 20, 1989), https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/de
fault/files/exe_order/eo_89-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3JX-676Y].
139
Va. Exec. Order No. 94 (July 14, 2005), http://digitool1.lva.lib.va.us:1801/webclient
/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1608519804687~384 [https://perma.cc/4JJS-ZDKD].
140
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 161 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor
.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_161.pdf [https://perma.cc/N337-PLL9].
141
Del. Exec. Order No. 10 (Sept. 7, 2009), https://archivesfiles.delaware.gov/Executive
-Orders/Markell/Markell_EO10.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFE7-P659].
142
Ala. Exec. Order No. 24 (Aug. 29, 1996), https://digital.archives.alabama.gov/digital
/collection/executive/id/388/rec/25 [https://perma.cc/M89C-2EB7].
143
Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06 (Aug. 15, 2012), https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital
/collection/execorders/id/1943/rec/14 [https://perma.cc/J5L4-5LFN].
144
La. Exec. Order No. BJ 15-16 (July 25, 2015), https://www.doa.la.gov/osr/other/bj15
-16.htm [https://perma.cc/D793-JR22].
145
Ohio Exec. Order No. 2018-12k (Dec. 19, 2018), https://das.ohio.gov/Portals/0/DASDivi
sions/CentralServices/pdf/Signed%20EO%202018-12K_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW7Y-MDL6].
146
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 170 (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/gover
nor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO%20%23170.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JL5-W3L7].
147
Iowa Exec. Order No. 7 (Aug. 5, 2020), https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/EO7%20-%20Voting%20Restoration.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRR4-2GCM].
148
See supra notes 69–82, 142–47.
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less on unilateral directives to influence individual rights? We seek to answer this
question in Part III by delineating our theoretical expectations based on insights
gleaned from the existing literature on executive unilateralism, most of which is
based on presidential executive orders.149 We speculate how federal-based theories150
can apply to the U.S. states and produce additional conjectures based on the uniqueness of these subnational contexts. Specifically, this Part considers how the following factors influence the issuance of rights-related unilateral directives at both the
federal and state levels: party and ideology; race and gender; public opinion, approval, and salience; federalism; and other political conditions.
A. Party and Ideology of Chief Executives
Chief executives’ partisan and ideological preferences should be a prime
motivator for their unilateral behavior.151 Though some scholars argue that Presidents of both parties use unilateral directives to advance their policy goals,152 others
find evidence that Democrats issue more executive orders than Republicans given
their proclivity for government intervention.153 We expect to find similar patterns
in the case of individual rights. Democrats have long championed the causes of
historically marginalized groups in areas including civil, voting, and labor rights.154
Thus, we expect that Presidents and governors belonging to the Democratic Party
should issue more unilateral directives broadening individual rights than Republicans. Even among Democrats, some chief executives are more progressive than
others.155 And so, we expect liberal executives to increase their use of unilateralism
149

See infra notes 153–89.
See infra notes 190–98.
151
See sources cited infra note 153.
152
KENNETH MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 3–7 (2001); Dennis W. Gleiber & Steven A. Shull, Presidential Influence
in the Policymaking Process, 45 W. POL. Q. 441, 453 (1992).
153
MAYER, supra note 152, at 88; ADAM L.WARBER, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE MODERN
PRESIDENCY: LEGISLATING FROM THE OVAL OFFICE 45 (2006); Brandon Rottinghaus &
Adam L. Warber, Unilateral Orders as Constituency Outreach: Executive Orders, Proclamations, and the Public Presidency, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 289, 302 (2015); Gleiber &
Shull, supra note 152, at 449.
154
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/black-history
/civil-rights-act [https://perma.cc/74T5-Z7WS] (Feb. 10, 2020); Voting Rights Act of 1965,
HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc
/BG9E-ZM99] (Aug. 25, 2020); New Deal, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/great
-depression/new-deal [https://perma.cc/77WY-RH2H] (Nov. 27, 2019).
155
See Jeremy Hobson & Allison Hagan, A Historical Look at Whether Democrats Can
Win by Playing to the Progressive Base, WBUR (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/here
andnow/2020/01/06/progressive-democrats-bernie-sanders-elizabeth-warren [https://perma
.cc/M62U-UAM4].
150
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to advocate for individual rights.156 Though unilateral directives restricting rights are
relatively rare, we expect that—when they do occur—they are employed more frequently by Republican and conservative executives.157 An alternative explanation for
the difference we predict might refer to the differences between the originalist and
living constitution interpretations of the law, which we attribute respectively to the
Republican and Democratic parties.158
B. Race and Gender of Chief Executives
Certain descriptive characteristics of chief executives might also explain unilateral
activity. This should be especially true among governors, who have been more diverse
than Presidents—particularly in recent years.159 Since theories of executive unilateralism have largely centered around U.S. Presidents, a notoriously homogenous group,
we wonder if the gender or race of an executive might actually predict differences
in executive policymaking.160
There is evidence, however, linking diversity to greater representation in other
policymaking choices and not just within the United States. Several studies find that
Black legislators are prone to represent the interests of Black constituents through
roll call votes.161 Others find that these legislators are also more likely to respond to
the concerns of Black citizens in general, even those residing outside of their
districts.162 In both U.S. federal and state legislative chambers, women legislators
156
See Civil Rights, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., https://democrats.org/where-we-stand
/the-issues/civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/HZ9J-X7XM] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
157
See supra notes 152–55.
158
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243 (2019) (surveying the
arguments in favor of original intent and more modern approaches to interpreting the law in
light of contemporary concerns).
159
Grace Sparks, There Has Been Very, Very Little Diversity Among US Governors, CNN
(May 23, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/23/politics/racial-diversity-gover
nors/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y5D9-RX62].
160
David Masci, Biden Is Only the Second Catholic President, but Nearly All Have Been
Christians, PEW RSCH.CTR.:FACT TANK, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/20
/almost-all-Presidents-have-been-christians/ [https://perma.cc/9XFN-39QH] (Jan. 20, 2021).
161
DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK-MAJORITY DISTRICTS 179 tbl.4.10, 180 (1999); Christian R. Grose,
Disentangling Constituency and Legislator Effects in Legislative Representation, 86 SOC.
SCI. Q. 427, 428 (2005); Neil Pinney & George Serra, The Congressional Black Caucus and
Vote Cohesion: Placing the Caucus Within House Voting Patterns, 52 POL. RSCH. Q. 583,
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are inclined to sponsor legislation related to women’s issues.163 In Argentina, gender
quotas increased the number of bills introduced on women’s rights.164 Reserving
Village Council seats for female members in India corresponds to greater investment
in policies beneficial to women.165 There is also some evidence linking the race and
gender of U.S. federal and state judges to increased representation in their rulings.166
Overall, the explanation underlying these empirical findings can be summarized
by Jane Mansbridge, who contends that “descriptive representation enhances the
substantive representation of [the group’s] interests by improving the quality of
deliberation.”167 The mechanism by which this occurs (i.e., intrinsically or extrinsically), however, has been the subject of debate amongst subsequent scholars.168
Regardless, we expect that women and minority governors should more actively
employ unilateral actions expanding individual rights, given the implications such
actions have for the substantive representation for their respective groups.
C. Public Opinion, Approval, and Salience
Beyond these preferences and characteristics, an individual executive’s relationship with the public is likely another important determinant of when they advance
individual rights.169 In his seminal book on presidential power, Richard Neustadt argued
that Presidents’ public prestige enhances their bargaining position in Washington.170
Legislators, who share the electoral fates of chief executives, have incentives to
facilitate the agendas of popular Presidents and governors for fear of retribution from
their constituents. Accordingly, executives with a higher public approval rating enjoy
greater success in achieving their legislative agendas.171 Presidents in particular can
Blacks’ Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI.
521, 528–29 (2013).
163
See generally, e.g., Kathleen A. Bratton, Critical Mass Theory Revisited: The Behavior
and Success of Token Women in State Legislatures, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 97, 103 (2005); Craig
Volden, Alan E. Wiseman & Dana E. Wittmer, Women’s Issues and Their Fates in the US Congress, 6 POL. SCI. RSCH. & METHODS 679 (2018).
164
See Susan Franceschet & Jennifer M. Piscopo, Gender Quotas and Women’s Substantive
Representation: Lessons from Argentina, 4 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 393, 395, 409 (2008).
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See Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy Makers: Evidence
from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409, 1411 (2004).
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241, 251–52 (2019).
167
Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A
Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. POL. 628, 628 (1999).
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“go public” on certain issues to place additional pressure on Congress, thus helping
their bargaining position and increasing their legislative success.172
Beyond Presidents’ legislative agendas, public support is likewise an important
constraint for unilateral action. Recent survey data reveals that the public is inherently skeptical of presidential unilateralism173 and that these actions can lead to negative policy and politician evaluations.174 Congress can also erode public support for
unilateral actions based on their objections.175 Yet, individuals who approve of the
President or align with his policy or partisan preferences are more inclined to support
unilateral action.176 Presidents, consequently, issue more executive orders when
holding higher public approval ratings, especially amongst Independents and those
outside of their party.177 We expect this relationship to extend to unilateral actions on
individual rights, particularly given their potential to directly impact citizens’ lives.
Moreover, public opinion on specific policies related to individual rights should
also motivate unilateralism. Some studies find that Presidents are responsive to
public opinion on distinct issues,178 particularly when they are in the minority party,
there are numerous persuadable voters, or polarization amongst the public is low.179
Others reveal that responsiveness is higher when Presidents simultaneously face
lower approval ratings and an election year.180 Recent survey experiments further
the President’s Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress, 29 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 183 (1985).
172
SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
21 (1986); Brandice Canes-Wrone, The President’s Legislative Influence from Public Appeals,
45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 313, 313–14 (2001).
173
Andrew Reeves & Jon C. Rogowski, Public Opinion Toward Presidential Power, 45
PRESIDENTIAL STUD.Q. 742, 747, 749 (2015) [hereinafter Reeves & Rogowski, Public Opinion];
Andrew Reeves & Jon C. Rogowski, The Public Cost of Unilateral Action, 62 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 424, 425 (2018) [hereinafter Reeves & Rogowski, Public Cost].
174
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Congress and the Political Costs of Unilateral Action, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 769, 770 (2017).
176
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Public Support for Unilateral Action, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 335, 336 (2016).
177
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Beyond the Base: Presidents, Partisan Approval, and the Political Economy of Unilateral
Action, 1 J. POL. INSTS. & POL. ECON. 79, 84 (2020).
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show that individuals are more supportive of unilateral actions that align with their
own policy preferences.181 Building upon this research, we expect public opinion to
likewise dictate unilateral behavior related to individual rights. More specifically,
chief executives should issue more rights-related directives when there is greater
public support for policy change in this area.
Relatedly, we expect governors and Presidents to actively engage in unilateralism
pertinent to individual rights when this issue area is highly salient to the public. Presidents are keenly aware of the value of the public’s attention and even use public appeals
to raise the salience of issues on which they would like Congress to act.182 Executives
can use public salience strategically in unilateral policymaking as well.183 In a working paper, Jon Rogowski finds that Presidents deploy more unilateral directives in
policy areas that are important to the public.184 Unilateral actions can be a way for executives to show the electorate that they are actively working on the issues it cares most
about.185 To this end, these actions can mobilize voters in ways that are beneficial to
Presidents’ electoral goals.186 Thus, they have clear incentives to respond to public
opinion on salient issues.187 For those issues the public cares less about, electoral
punishments for presidential inaction or non-responsiveness are less likely.188 We
expect these dynamics to occur in the area of individual rights as well, for both
Presidents and governors.
D. Federalism
State governments are famously known as “laboratories of democracy,”189 able to
try new policies not yet seen on the federal landscape.190 This concept is rooted in
Canes-Wrone, Michael C. Herron & Kenneth W. Shotts, Leadership and Pandering: A Theory
of Executive Policymaking, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 532 (2001).
181
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182
BRANDICE CANES-WRONE, WHO LEADS WHOM? PRESIDENTS, POLICY, AND THE
PUBLIC 1, 3 (2006).
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184
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the Tenth Amendment, which grants states all powers not delegated to the federal government.191 Together, these ideas form the basis for federalism, where political power
is divided between central and subnational governments.192 Though states often create
policies in response to federal mandates, such as No Child Left Behind or Medicaid,
federalism implies policy entrepreneurship on the part of the states—particularly in the
absence of federal leadership.193 For instance, many New Deal policies, labor laws, and
health care reforms at the national level were fashioned after state-led policies.194
Likewise, California’s pioneering environmental policies, such as regulations on emissions along with cap and trade, have served as the prototype across the country.195
Accordingly, we expect governors to consider the prospect of federal policymaking
when issuing unilateral directives related to individual rights.196 Though governors
could follow the federal government’s lead in policymaking on individual rights, we
instead expect them to fill any voids left by national political actors.197 That is, governors should more vigorously use unilateral directives to expand rights when federal
inaction or restrictiveness is imminent, as they did in the case of transgender rights
presented in the Introduction. On the other hand, a strong gubernatorial response is
needed less if Presidents are actively committed to individual rights.
E. Other Political Factors
Finally, there are a number of other political factors that could influence executive
unilateralism more generally. One of the most pervasive questions in the executive
policymaking literature is whether Presidents and governors use more unilateral directives to bypass an ideologically unfriendly legislature or whether they are
constrained by their legislative opponents when exercising this power. Scholarship
largely finds that latter. That is, modern Presidents issue fewer unilateral directives
under divided government, due to the threat of legislative retaliation for unfavorable
executive actions.198 Relatedly, legislatures with a stronger coalition (e.g., veto-proof
191

See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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195
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majority or low polarization) should be better able to statutorily retaliate against
oppositional governors and thus serve as a stronger deterrent for unilateral action.199
Legislatures with greater institutional resources can more easily punish executives,
which should likewise inhibit unilateralism.200
Chief executives often pursue more unilateral activity in response to a vulnerable
economy, as Nixon and Carter did to impose price controls amidst rising inflation.201
At the same time, a poor economy might depress public support for presidential action
and consequently deter unilateralism.202 Lastly, governors and Presidents can be strategic about when they engage in more or less unilateral behavior. They might be more
reticent to issue directives during election years, given possible public backlash.203
However, lame-duck executives could be more likely to engage in unilateralism, due
to less fear of electoral consequences, and to more aggressively pursue items on
their agendas.204
IV. ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES
Part IV sets out to test these theoretical expectations by analyzing presidential
executive orders and memoranda. We describe the procedure we used to collect and
code executive directives based on different categories of individual rights. We then
present summary statistics and employ regression analyses to more thoroughly test
our expectations. Overall, we find that Presidents issue more rights-related directives
if they are Democratic or liberal, when they have higher public approval ratings,
when the issue is salient to Democratic Presidents’ agendas, and when the public polls
reflect a greater positive effect for African Americans.
A. Data Collection, Coding, and Summary Statistics
To analyze presidential directives, we collect data on all executive orders and
memoranda issued by Presidents between 1981 and 2018. We begin our analysis in
ACTION, at xv (2003); Alexander Bolton & Sharece Thrower, Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 661 (2016); Fang-Yi Chiou & Lawrence S.
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199
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200
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the first year of the Reagan administration, given widespread views that he was the
first President to systematically employ unilateral directives to assert presidential
prerogatives and advance his overall policy agenda.205 We collect data on memoranda from the Federal Register. As previously mentioned, federal law does not
mandate that memoranda be made public record.206 Presidents thus elect to publish
some in the Federal Register but not others.207 As such, we search the Public Papers
of the Presidents to identify unpublished memoranda.208 Executive orders, on the
other hand, are required to be published in the Federal Register, and can thus be
easily located and cross-checked using both sources.209
We read through the content of each executive order and memorandum to code
whether it relates to individual rights. Following Emily Zackin’s book, Looking for
Rights in All the Wrong Places, we define rights as “the basis for a justified demand”
that “entitle citizens not simply to request particular policies from the government,
but also demand that government enact those policies as a matter of obligation.”210
We recognize that rights may come in different forms. Some scholars, for instance,
make the distinction between negative and positive rights.211 The former guard
citizens against actions of the government.212 These are classically guaranteed in the
U.S. Constitution through the Bill of Rights,213 including freedom of speech,214
205
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206
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protection against unlawful search and seizure,215 and due process.216 Many of these
same rights are specified across state constitutions as well.217 Positive rights are
those that protect against external threats and usually demand that the government
provides citizens with certain services or policies.218 Mostly found in state constitutions, these rights can include labor rights (e.g., the right to work, unionize, fair
wages),219 the right to an education,220 and various services or guarantees to underprivileged communities (such as the elderly and poor).221 Others make a distinction
between first and second generation rights—the former being related to civil and
political rights (including equality, freedom of expression, rights of accused), while
the latter pertains to social and economic rights (including labor rights, housing, and
other social welfare benefits).222 These categories roughly correspond to negative
and positive rights, respectively.223
We pull executive orders for our sample corpus from the years 1981 to 2018
because that is perhaps the most representative period of the Republican and Democratic parties in the recent past, as well as matches scholarly consensus that President
Reagan was the first to systematically wield unilateral powers.224 Accordingly, we
code unilateral directives as being related to individual rights if they have direct implications for any of these broad categories of rights. We also determine whether
each directive expands or constricts individual rights. Of the ninety executive orders
and sixty-four memoranda issued between 1981 and 2018 relating to individual
rights, the majority of them are expansive (81% of rights orders and 91% of rights
memoranda) rather than restrictive.
215
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217
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Furthermore, we assign each directive into at least one of the following categories according to standardized coding schemes: civil rights, labor rights, freedom of
expression, freedom of religion, right to bear arms, rights of the accused, freedom of
movement (i.e., rights for immigrants), international human rights, voting rights, right
to privacy, and other.225 Figure 1 shows the number of executive orders and memoranda issued between 1981 and 2018 by each of these categories.226 The majority of
individual rights directives involved civil rights, followed by labor rights.227 Presidents
issued forty-five executive orders (46% of rights orders) and forty-five executive
memoranda (68% of rights memoranda) in the area of civil rights.228 There were
thirty-three orders (34%) and three memoranda (4.5%) related to labor rights.229 The
other categories received substantially less unilateral attention, all of which contained fewer than ten directives.230 Of these, the largest areas included freedom of
movement (three orders; nine memoranda) and international human rights (nine
orders; two memoranda).231
Figure 1: Presidential Directives by Individual Rights Categories

225
226
227
228
229
230
231

Since some directives span multiple rights categories, we allow them to be coded as such.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
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Because civil rights constitute the bulk of rights directives, we divide this category into multiple subcategories, which include: promoting diversity, hate crimes,
veterans, equal opportunity/antidiscrimination, disabilities, women, racial minorities, elderly, commemorative, LGBT, and other.232 Figure 2 shows the number of
executive orders and memoranda in each of these subcategories.233 Directives are
more dispersed among the civil rights subcategories, with the most directives being
related to racial minorities.234 Presidents issued twenty-three executive orders (51%
of civil rights orders) and thirteen executive memoranda (29% of civil rights
memoranda) on minority rights.235 Relatedly, a substantial number of directives were
used to promote diversity and equal opportunity/antidiscrimination policies. Of the
directives concerning civil rights, eight executive orders (18%) and nine memoranda
(20%) were on diversity, while seven orders (16%) and thirteen executive memoranda (29%) related to equal opportunity/antidiscrimination.236 Directives pertaining
to individuals with disabilities (eight orders and six memoranda) and women (seven
orders and eight memoranda) were utilized to a lesser extent.237
Figure 3 graphs all executive orders and memoranda on individual rights issued
yearly between 1981 and 2018.238 The number of orders exceeded memoranda for
most of this time series, with the exception of periods in the mid-1990s under Clinton
and mid-2010s under Obama.239 These Democratic presidencies were also distinctive
for their peaks in overall unilateral rights-based activity (e.g., Clinton in 1994 and
2000 and Obama in 2009).240 Such actions, conversely, reached notable lows during
Republican administrations (e.g., Bush in the early 2000s).241 Overall though, there
is substantial variation across time in the degree to which Presidents relied on these
unilateral actions.242

232
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233
See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Presidential Directives by Civil Rights Subcategories

Figure 3: Presidential Individual Rights Directives Over Time, 1981–2018
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We further explore this variation in Tables 1 and 2, which show the summary
statistics for rights-related executive orders243 and memoranda,244 respectively, for
each administration. Some Presidents did not use any rights orders (i.e., Reagan between 1984–1985, Clinton in 1995, and George W. Bush in 2003, 2005, and 2007)
or memoranda (i.e., Reagan in 1981 and 1985, George H.W. Bush in 1992, and
George W. Bush in 2005), while Clinton issued a maximum of nine executive orders
in 2000 and six memoranda in both 1994 and 1998.245 Clinton also utilized more
overall directives related to individual rights than any other President, averaging
about 3 orders and 3.5 memoranda per year.246 Trump (2.5 orders and 3 memoranda)
and Obama (3.1 orders and 2.1 memoranda) closely followed.247
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Individual Rights-Related
Executive Orders by President
President
Ronald Reagan
George H.W. Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Donald Trump

Years
1981–1988
1989–1992
1993–2000
2001–2008
2009–2016
2016–2018

Mean
1.875
2.25
3
1.5
3.125
2.5

Std. Dev.
1.727
1.893
2.976
1.512
2.232
2.121

Min
0
1
0
0
1
1

Max
4
5
9
4
8
4

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Individual Rights-Related
Memoranda by President
President
Ronald Reagan
George H.W. Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Donald Trump

Years
1981–1988
1989–1992
1993–2000
2001–2008
2009–2016
2016–2018

Mean
0.5
1.25
3.5
0.5
2.125
3

Std. Dev.
0.535
0.957
2.07
0.535
1.356
2.828

Min
0
0
1
0
1
1

Max
1
2
6
1
5
5

On the other end, both Reagan and George W. Bush signed the least number of
memoranda (0.5 per year, each) and orders (1.9 and 1.5 per year, respectively).248 In
243
244
245
246
247
248

See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Tables 1, 2.
See infra Tables 1, 2.
See infra Tables 1, 2.
See supra Tables 1, 2.
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general, Republican Presidents issued fewer rights directives than Democrats, with the
exception of Trump.249 However, when considering the content of these orders, Trump
largely falls in line with his Republican predecessors in using more of them to retract
rights—such as his 2017 memorandum reinstating the transgender military ban.250 Likewise, he issued several orders increasing immigration enforcement and restricting immigrant rights.251 We consider these distinctions more closely in the following section.
B. Regression Analysis of Presidential Unilateral Directives
To begin, we examine the average number of unilateral directives that expand or
contract individual rights by presidential party in Figure 4.252 As expected, Democratic
Presidents used more unilateral directives, summed across executive orders and
memoranda, to expand rights than Republican Presidents—averaging about five and
two directives per year, respectively.253 On the other hand, Republicans issued more
directives to reduce individual rights than Democrats, though this average is low for
Presidents of both parties (less than one directive per year).254
Figure 4: Presidential Individual Directives by Presidential Party

Our model uses an executive’s party affiliation as a variable for predicting executive directives and their content. We conduct regression analyses to further examine
249
250
251
252
253
254

See supra Tables 1, 2.
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See infra Figure 4.
See infra Figure 4.
See infra Figure 4.
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these descriptive differences among parties. Table 3 depicts coefficients and standard
errors from negative binomial regression models estimating the effect of presidential
party and ideology on the issuance of rights-related unilateral directives.255 We use
three different dependent variables. First, we count the number of directives related to
individual rights issued per year (columns 1 and 4). Second, we use the annual number of directives that specifically expand individual rights (columns 2 and 5). Lastly,
we aggregate the number of directives that contract rights in columns 3 and 6. To
measure presidential policy preferences, we first use an indicator for Democratic
President, coded as 1 if the President is a Democrat and 0 if he is a Republican. Next,
we measure Presidential Conservatism by using the DW-NOMINATE ideal point
estimates,256 where positive (negative) values correspond to conservative (liberal)
ideologies. Because presidential party and ideology are highly related,257 we estimate
the impact of these two independent variables in separate equations.
The regression results show that being a Democratic President is positively
associated with issuing rights-related directives, as represented by the positive and
statistically significant coefficient on Democratic President in column 1.258 In other
words, Presidents belonging to the Democratic Party issue 2.15 times more unilateral directives related to individual rights than Republicans.259 This amounts to about
three additional directives per year, on average, under Democratic Presidents.260 The
positive effect becomes even stronger when isolating directives that expand individual
rights but that effect reverses for those that retract them.261 In particular, Democratic
Presidents are 3.13 times more likely to issue rights-expanding directives but about
79% less likely to use directives for restricting individual rights.262
Table 3: Presidential Individual Rights Directives,
Party, and Ideology (No Controls)
(1) All

(2) Expands

Rights

(3) Con-

(4) All

tracts

Rights

Democratic

0.77

1.14

-1.58

President

(0.22)***

(0.23)***

(0.60)***

255

(5) Expands

(6) Contracts

See infra Table 3.
See About the Project, VOTEVIEW.COM, https://voteview.com/about [https://perma.cc
/SVM9-QBT9] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (discussing methodology used to create the dataset
map of every congressional roll call). See generally KEITH T. POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING (2005) (discussing methodology used to analyze roll call voting data).
257
The correlation between Democrat President and Presidential Conservatism is -0.98.
See infra Table 3.
258
See infra Table 3.
259
See infra Table 3.
260
See infra Table 3.
261
See infra Table 3.
262
See infra Table 3.
256
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(1) All

(2) Expands

Rights

(3) Con-

(4) All

tracts

Rights

(5) Expands

(6) Contracts

0.76 (0.42)*

Presidential

-0.75

-0.95

Conservatism

(0.19)***

(0.21)***

Constant

N

1.00

0.60

(0.16)***

(0.17)***

38

38

-0.10 (0.28)

38
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1.48

1.35

(0.11)***

(0.12)***

-1.12
(0.32)***

36

36

36

Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

We find similar effects when alternatively examining presidential ideology.263
Conservative Presidents issue significantly fewer rights and rights-expanding directives,
but more rights-restricting ones, than their liberal counterparts.264 Specifically, for every
standard deviation increase in Presidential Conservatism, total rights directives decrease by 33% (about two directives), rights-expanding directives drop by 38% (about
three), and rights-contracting directives increase by 71% (less than one).265 Consistent
with our expectations, these results reveal that Democratic and liberal Presidents engage
in more unilateral activity to advance individual rights compared to other Presidents.266
When Republicans and conservatives do issue them, they do so restrictively.
We introduce other independent variables that might explain unilateral activity in
Table 4.267 In addition to public approval and opinion (which we will return to later in
this section), we also control for divided government, presidential election year, the unemployment rate, and lame-duck Presidents, as well as legislative and executive capacities (as measured by expenditures).268 Interestingly, we find that Presidents issue fewer
rights-expanding orders and more restrictive ones during their final year in office.269
263

See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
265
See supra Table 3.
266
See supra Table 3.
267
See infra Table 4.
268
See infra Table 4. The Divided Government index is scored as 1 if the President and
at least one chamber of Congress is from opposing parties and 0 if they are all from the same
party. Presidential Election Year is measured as 1 in presidential election years (1984, 1988,
1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016) and 0 otherwise. The annual unemployment rate
is collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cps/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2021). Lame Duck is coded as 1 if the President is in his last year in office and 0 otherwise.
Both legislative and executive expenditures are collected from the Statistical Abstracts of the
United States. See Statistical Abstracts Series, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/library/publications/time-series/statistical_abstracts.html [https://perma.cc/S7A9-USGS]
(Dec. 19, 2018).
269
See infra Table 4.
264
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None of the other control variables, however, have a statistically significant effect
on rights directives, counter to broader studies of unilateralism.270
Table 4: Presidential Individual Rights Directives,
Party, and Ideology (Controls)
(1) All

(2) Expands

Rights

(3) Con-

(4) All

tracts

Rights

Democratic

1.02

1.21

-0.50

President

(0.22)***

(0.22)***

(0.63)

(5) Expands

(6) Contracts

-0.09 (0.50)

Presidential

-0.82

-0.94

Conservatism

(0.17)***

(0.17)***
3.07 (3.63)

-5.24 (9.38)

0.01 (0.02)

Public

2.68

Conservatism

(0.88)***

Presidential

0.03

Approval

(0.01)**

Divided Gov-

0.14

ernment

(0.26)

President Elec-

0.19

tion Year

(0.26)

Unemployment

0.07

1.00 (0.91)

7.80

4.04

(1.70)***

(3.32)

0.04

-0.01

0.03

0.03

(0.01)***

(0.03)

(0.01)**

(0.01)**

-0.06 (0.27)

2.18

0.16

-0.05 (0.27)

(0.73)***

(0.26)

-1.23

0.18

(0.69)*

(0.26)

0.28 (0.26)

0.02 (0.08)

(0.07)
Lame Duck

0.09

0.08

(0.17)

(0.07)

15.40
(0.66)***

0.26 (0.25)

-1.74
(0.77)**

0.02 (0.08)

0.27 (0.21)

0.01

-0.72

2.46

0.03

-0.72

3.94

(0.30)

(0.36)**

(0.74)***

(0.30)

(0.35)**

(0.98)***

Legislative Ex-

1.33

1.10 (1.27)

4.20

1.38

1.15 (1.31)

6.83

penditures

(1.14)

(2.38)*

(1.18)

Executive Ex-

-0.62

-2.79

-0.38

-0.00 (0.64)

-5.27

penditures

(0.54)

(1.34)**

(0.61)

Constant

-13.62

-18.24

-21.02

(14.21)

(17.49)

(25.24)

(13.94)

(16.49)

(33.73)

N

38

38

38

36

36

36

-0.33 (0.58)

-16.68

(3.17)**

(2.08)***

-26.30

-20.30

Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Even when accounting for these alternative explanations in the regression models
in Table 4, we find the same effects for presidential party and ideology as before.271
Though Democratic and liberal Presidents correspond to significant increases in directives that broaden individual rights, we find little impact of these variables on those
270
271

See infra Table 4.
Compare Table 4, supra, with Table 3, supra.
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that contract rights—as evidenced by the statistically insignificant coefficients on
Democratic President and Presidential Conservatism (columns 3 and 6).272 This inconsistent effect may be due to the fact that only a small proportion of rights-related
directives are actually used restrictively.273 The public can also play an important role
in shaping unilateral activity related to individual rights,274 which we explore in a
variety of ways. To begin, we include the President’s job approval rating (Presidential Approval) as a more general measure of his standing with the public.275 As shown
in Table 4, the coefficient for this variable is positive and statistically significant,
meaning that Presidents with higher approval may reliably engage in greater unilateral
activity on individual rights.276 In particular, a percentage increase in the President’s
job approval rating corresponds to an uptick in all rights and rights-expanding directives
by 2–3% and 4%, respectively.277 Presidential Approval does not significantly influence directives that contract individual rights.278 Consistent with our expectations,
Presidents with greater overall political capital appear better positioned to unilaterally
advance rights policies.279
Next, we roughly measure the public’s preferences for individual rights advancement by including a variable for Public Conservatism, collected from the American
National Elections Survey (ANES), in Table 4.280 We expect that Presidents should
employ fewer rights directives when the public has a low overall desire for active rights
policies, as approximated by greater conservatism.281 Instead, the results reveal that
272

See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
274
See, e.g., Rogowski, supra note 184, at 31.
275
Presidential Approval is measured by the Gallup Poll and aggregated by year. See
Presidential Job Approval Center, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presi
dential-job-approval-center.aspx [https://perma.cc/L24A-CUGV] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
276
See supra Table 4.
277
In another analysis (not shown), we compared separate measurements for presidential
approval among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. We find that presidential approval
did not differentially affect unilateral activity across these distinct groups.
278
See supra Table 4.
279
See supra Table 4.
280
See supra Table 4; Liberal-Conservative Self-Identification 1972–2016, AM. NAT’L
ELEC.STUD., https://electionstudies.org/resources/anes-guide/top-tables/?id=29 [https://perma
.cc/BV4B-CN89] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). The ANES provides respondents with a sevenpoint scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. For example, the post-2016 election questionnaire asked: “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.
Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale
or haven’t you thought much about this?” AM. NAT’L ELEC. STUD., 2016 POST-ELECTION
QUESTIONNAIRE 42–43, https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/anes_time
series_2016_qnaire_post.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z84-EBCK]. We aggregated responses to
the national level. The measure ranges from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative).
281
See Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Does Public Opinion Constrain Presidential Unilateralism?, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1071, 1076 (2019).
273
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unilateralism is much less responsive to public ideology.282 That is, Presidents issue
more rights directives as public conservatism increases (column 1).283 Though
ostensibly counterintuitive, this effect appears to be driven by directives that contract
individual rights (column 3).284 More specifically, Presidents augment their rightsretracting directives by seventy percent for every one standard deviation increase in
public conservatism.285 The ideology of the public, conversely, does not reliably impact
directives that expand individual rights.286 Thus, upon closer inspection, we find evidence that Presidents are seemingly responsive to public ideology.287 Public Conservatism, however, is just a crude measure of the public’s policy preferences towards
individual rights.288 We thus turn to an exploration of civil rights directives, which
allows us to utilize more precise estimates of public opinion and salience.
As before, we graph the average number of civil rights directives by presidential
party in Figure 5, but we focus exclusively on those that expand rights.289 On average,
Democratic Presidents issue more civil rights directives per year (four) than their
Republican counterparts (one).290 This pattern corresponds with our theoretical expectations and is consistent with our previous findings for individual rights more broadly.291
Figure 5: Presidential Civil Rights Directives by Presidential Party

282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
See infra Figure 5.
See infra Figure 5.
See infra Figure 5.
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Table 5 uses negative binomial regressions to estimate the effects of these and other
variables of interest on the number of civil rights directives issued per year. Once
again, presidential party and ideology significantly impact the use of these directives,
but to an even greater degree than before.292 The frequency of these directives increases
by 268% for Democratic Presidents but decreases by 64% for every standard deviation
increase in Presidential Conservatism.293 We also find strong effects from the public,
with higher presidential approval correlating with executives passing more civil rights
directives.294 Public Conservatism, however, does not appear to influence the occurrence of these directives.295
Table 5: Presidential Civil Rights Directives (Expands) and Salience

Democratic President

(1)
1.50
(0.32)***

Presidential Conservatism
Public Salience
Presidential Salience
Democratic President x
Public Salience
Democratic President x
Presidential Salience
Public Conservatism
Presidential Approval
Divided Government
Presidential Election Year
Unemployment
Lame Duck

292
293
294
295

See infra Table 5.
See infra Table 5.
See infra Table 5.
See infra Table 5.

-6.55
(7.27)
0.22
(0.16)

1.30
(1.36)
0.04
(0.02)**
-0.45
(0.41)
0.41
(0.39)
0.06
(0.10)
-0.78
(0.40)**

(2)

-1.16
(0.24)***
-5.04
(7.81)
0.23
(0.16)

5.10
(4.73)
0.04
(0.02)**
-0.45
(0.40)
0.40
(0.39)
0.07
(0.10)
-0.83
(0.38)**

(3)
(4)
2.20
0.04
(0.63)*** (0.43)

13.09
(12.83)
0.21
(0.16)
-23.41
(15.95)

-4.67
(6.27)
-0.35
(0.21)*

0.82
(0.20)***
0.22
1.11
(1.42)
(1.38)
0.04
0.04
(0.02)*** (0.02)**
-0.58
-0.89
(0.41)
(0.42)**
0.38
0.69
(0.40)
(0.26)***
0.01
0.13
(0.11)
(0.10)
-0.48
-0.96
(0.60)
(0.48)**
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Legislative Expenditures
Executive Expenditures

(1)
0.30
(1.59)
-0.93
(0.64)

(2)
0.42
(1.58)
-0.45
(0.72)

(3)
0.29
(1.61)
-0.91
(0.66)

749
(4)
-0.77
(1.54)
-0.74
(0.67)

Constant

16.55
0.68
16.41
35.76
(24.16)
(23.19)
(24.61)
(22.45)
N
38
36
38
38
Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors
clustered by year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
We further examine the role of the public with measures of civil rights salience
in Table 5.296 First, we include a variable measuring the percentage of survey respondents indicating that civil rights is the most important problem facing the nation (Public
Salience).297 We likewise measure presidential salience by including a logged count
of the number of times the President mentioned civil rights in his State of the Union
Address in a given year (Presidential Salience).298 As shown in columns 1 and 2,
neither of these variables alone significantly impact civil rights directives.299 This
relationship, however, may be dependent upon the President’s policy preferences.300
Presidents might only be responsive to the public’s call for civil rights advancement
if they fundamentally believe it to be a desirable policy. Likewise, presidential salience
may only lead to more expansive civil rights directives for Democratic Presidents.
We investigate these hypotheses via the interaction term analyzing the combination
of Democratic President with Public Salience and Presidential Salience in columns
3 and 4 of Table 5. There appears to be no significant relationship between public
salience and being a Democratic President. However, the coefficient on Democratic
296

See supra Table 5.
This variable is collected by the Comparative Agendas Project and is aggregated by
year. See United States: Datasets, COMPAR. AGENDAS PROJECT, https://www.comparative
agendas.net/us [https://perma.cc/D5Y6-MW3P] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). Specifically, the
Gallup Poll question asks: “What do you think is the most important problem facing the
country today?” Most Important Problem, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most
-important-problem.aspx [https://perma.cc/5B57-3R8C] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
298
This variable is collected from the Comparative Agendas Project, where they count the
number of quasi-sentences mentioned in each President’s State of the Union Address (or
inaugural speech) by issue area. See United States: Datasets, supra note 297. Given the skewed
nature of the data, we log this count.
299
See supra Table 5.
300
See, e.g., Strengthening Civil Rights, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/civil-rights [https://perma.cc/99EU-8JMB] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2021).
297
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President x Presidential Salience is positive and statistically significant, suggesting
a conditional relationship does exist.301 For ease of interpretation, we graphically
depict these interactive effects in Figure 6.302 Specifically, this figure shows the marginal effects of being a Democratic President on the predicted number of civil rights
directives (y-axis), at different levels of presidential salience along the x-axis.303 When
salience is low, Democratic Presidents issue no more directives than Republicans.304
However, as public salience for civil rights increases, the impact of Democratic
Presidents becomes positive and statistically significant.305 When public salience is
at its highest, Democratic Presidents issue about nine more directives related to civil
rights than Republicans in a given year.306
Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Democratic President on Presidential Civil
Rights Directives by Presidential Salience

301
We find analogous effects when using Presidential Conservatism as an alternative
measure for party.
302
See infra Figure 6.
303
See infra Figure 6.
304
See infra Figure 6.
305
See infra Figure 6.
306
See infra Figure 6.
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Furthermore, we measure the impact of public opinion on civil rights in Table
6 by using feeling thermometers for under-represented groups.307 These measures
are collected from the ANES survey, which asks a nationally representative selection
of Americans how positively their feelings are towards a certain group (i.e., African
Americans, women, Hispanic, LGBT individuals) on a scale of 0 to 100, with higher
values indicating more positive feelings.308 On the whole, we find that Presidents
seem to be positively responsive to public sentiment towards African Americans.309
Specifically, annual civil rights directives rise by 42% for every one-point increase
in the Black feeling thermometer.310 A point increase in warmness towards women,
on the other hand, depresses unilateral actions related to civil rights by 12%.311 Thus,
Presidents actually issue fewer expansive civil rights directives when the public feels
warmly towards women but more when public opinion has soured. There is no statistically significant relationship between the Hispanic or LGBT feeling thermometers
and civil rights directives.312 Taken together, Presidents seem to be responsive towards
public feelings on African Americans but use unilateral directives to safeguard civil
rights when women are the subject of public scorn.
Table 6: Presidential Civil Rights Directives
(Expands) and Feeling Thermometers

Black FT
Women FT
Hispanic FT
LGBT FT

(1)
0.31 (0.17)***

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.09 (0.04)**
-0.16 (0.13)
-0.04 (0.03)

Control
YES
YES
YES
YES
Variables
Constant
-5.05 (28.41)
22.29 (21.55)
-10.81 (33.11)
-39.24 (32.72)
N
36
38
36
35
Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by
year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
307

See infra Table 6.
See ANES Continuity Guide, AM. NAT’L ELEC. STUD., https://electionstudies.org/re
sources/anes-continuity-guide/ [https://perma.cc/9KXX-AKSC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
309
See infra Table 6.
310
See infra Table 6.
311
See infra Table 6.
312
We test the interaction terms between Democratic President with each of these “feeling
thermometers,” and we find that the interaction terms are non-significant, suggesting Democratic
Presidents are no more responsive to public sentiment towards these groups than Republicans.
308
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V. ANALYSIS OF STATE EXECUTIVE ORDERS
How do our theoretical expectations fare when considering unilateralism at the
state level? Part V sets out to answer this very question. We first describe our process
for collecting and coding rights-related gubernatorial executive orders. Using regression
analyses, we test the same conjectures that we did for the federal level (i.e., party
and ideology; public approval, opinion, and salience; and other political factors) and
others that are specific to the state-level context (i.e., race and gender; federalism).
Overall, our analysis in this Part largely confirms the results for presidential
directives.313 Democratic and liberal governors pen more rights-related executive
orders than other executives.314 Peaks in unilateral activity on individual rights occur
when gubernatorial approval is high, particularly amongst liberals and moderates, and
when the public views civil rights as important or holds positive feelings towards
African Americans. Uniquely, we uncover little evidence that women or minority executives promote substantive representation in the realm of unilateral rights directives.315 We do, however, find that threats from restrictive Republican Presidents
motivate governors to unilaterally guard individual rights.316
A. Data Collection, Coding, and Summary Statistics
We collect data on executive orders issued by state governors between 1981 and
2018 from a variety of sources, including state registers, online databases, and archival
records.317 Though some states keep a comprehensive collection of their executive
orders online (e.g., Massachusetts, Texas), it is common for others to only digitize
recent administrations and maintain physical copies of the rest in state archives and
libraries (e.g., Nevada).318 States vary tremendously, however, on how well they manage these records and for which years records exist.319 In all, we were able to obtain
executive orders for forty-six states, but to varying degrees, as shown in Table 7.320
313

Compare Section V.B, infra, with Section IV.B, supra.
See infra Section V.B.
315
See infra Section V.B.
316
See infra Section V.B.
317
We took data from the aforementioned data repositories and scored the different orders
accordingly.
318
See, e.g., Massachusetts Executive Orders, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/massa
chusetts-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/GY5T-4PTL] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); Texas
Governors, LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR. TEX., https://lrl.texas.gov/legeLeaders/governors/search
.cfm [https://perma.cc/FT7S-UBF8] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); Executive Orders, NV.GOV,
https://gov.nv.gov/News/Executive_Orders/Executive_Orders/ [https://perma.cc/XJW8-6MP7]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
319
Compare Massachusetts Executive Orders, supra note 318, with Executive Orders,
supra note 318.
320
See infra Table 7.
314
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States such as Kentucky and Arkansas only had executive orders for recent years,
while most others had complete records for the entire time frame.321
Table 7: Summary Statistics on Individual Rights Executive Orders by State
State

Year

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Alabama

1981–2018

0.421

0.826

0

4

Alaska

1981–2016

0

0

0

0

Arizona

1981–2018

0.737

1.131

0

6

Arkansas

2005, 2008–2010, 2015–2018

0.125

0.354

0

1

California

1981–2015

0.629

1.031

0

4

Colorado
Connecticut

1981–2018
1981–2018

0.789
0.289

1.094
0.732

0
0

4
4

Hawaii

1981–2018

0

0

0

0

Idaho

1981–2018

0.605

1.079

0

4

Illinois

1999–2018

0.55

1.191

0

5

Indiana

1999–2016

0.25

0.639

0

2

Iowa

1981–2018

0.184

0.393

0

1

Kansas

1981–2018

0.342

0.627

0

2

Kentucky

2000; 2007; 2009–2014

0.125

0.354

0

1

Maine

1981–2018

0.447

0.645

0

2

Maryland

1981–2018

0.368

0.819

0

4

Massachusetts

1981–2018

1.684

1.817

0

9

Michigan

1981–2018

0.658

0.909

0

3

Minnesota

1981–2018

0.579

1.056

0

5

Mississippi

1981–2018

0.342

0.627

0

2

Missouri

1981–2018

0.474

0.603

0

2

Montana

1981–2000; 2005–2018

0.457

0.886

0

4

Nebraska

1981–2018

0.079

0.273

0

1

Nevada

1981–2018

0.053

0.226

0

1

New Hampshire

1981–2018

0.368

0.786

0

4

New Jersey

1990–2018

0.379

0.677

0

2

New Mexico

1981–2018

0.632

0.998

0

4

New York

1981–2018

1.526

2.938

0

15

North Carolina

1993–2018

0.692

0.97

0

4

North Dakota

1998–2018

0

0

0

0

321

See infra Table 7.
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Year

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Ohio

1981–2018

1.368

2.098

0

9

Oklahoma

1985–2018

0.158

0.437

0

2

Oregon

1981–1999; 2003–2018

0.543

0.9

0

3

Pennsylvania

1993–2018

1.192

1.674

0

5

Rhode Island

1981–2018

0.711

1.206

0

6

South Carolina

1981–2018

0.289

0.565

0

2

South Dakota

1993–2018

0.192

0.402

0

2

Tennessee

1995–2018

0.125

0.338

0

1

Texas

1993–2018

0.231

0.514

0

2

Utah

1981–2018

0.737

1.131

0

5

Vermont

1993–2018

0.192

0.491

0

2

Virginia

1997–2015

1.316

1.293

0

4

Washington

1981–2018

0.684

1.093

0

5

West Virginia

1993–2018

0.346

0.689

0

2

Wisconsin

1981–2018

0.658

1.214

0

6

Wyoming

1993–2018

0.269

0.533

0

2

We read and assigned each order to at least one category of individual rights in
the same manner as previously outlined for federal directives. We identified 813 gubernatorial executive orders related to individual rights.322 Differing from the federal
level, governors use them almost exclusively to expand rights (99% of all rights
orders) rather than restrict them.323
As with presidential directives, gubernatorial executive orders concerning individual rights largely pertained to civil rights—as shown in Figure 7.324 Across the
states, governors issued over 600 executive orders during this time frame related to
civil rights (78% of all rights orders).325 Labor is the only other category with over 100
executive orders (132 orders, 15% of all rights orders).326 Otherwise, governors issued
relatively few executive orders within the other individual rights categories.327
Figure 8 depicts the number of executive orders issued within the same civil rights
subcategories designated in the previous section. Similar to Presidents, governors
issued the most civil rights directives in categories related to antidiscrimination (21%),
persons with disabilities (24%), women (19%), and racial minorities (22%).328 Less
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

See infra Figure 7.
See infra Figure 7.
See infra Figure 7.
See infra Figure 7.
See infra Figure 7.
See infra Figure 7.
See infra Figure 8.
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than fifty executive orders were issued in the other categories, amounting to 14% of
all civil rights directives.329
Figure 7: Gubernatorial Executive Orders by Individual Rights Categories

Figure 8: Gubernatorial Executive Orders by Civil Rights Subcategories

329

See infra Figure 8.
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Table 7 shows the summary statistics for executive orders by state.330 Three states
(Hawaii, Alaska, and North Dakota), to our knowledge, did not issue any rights-related
orders in the entire time span recorded.331 New York, Massachusetts, and Ohio governors deployed the most orders, with an average of 1.5, 1.7, and 1.3 per year, respectively, and a maximum of fifteen (2018 under New York Democratic Governor
Andrew Cuomo) and nine (1993 under Massachusetts Republican Governor Bill Weld
and 1996 under Ohio Republican Governor George Voinovich).332 We further explore
this variation, and how it relates to our variables of interest, in the following section.
B. Regression Analysis of State Executive Orders
Figure 9 depicts the average number of individual and civil rights executive
orders by gubernatorial party.333 As expected, Democrats relied more on these orders
than Republicans.334 Specifically, Democratic governors issued an average of 0.66
individual rights and 0.55 civil rights orders per year, while these averages were
0.39 and 0.34, respectively, under their Republican counterparts.335
Figure 9: Gubernatorial Rights Executive Orders, by Party

330
331
332
333
334
335

See supra Table 7.
See supra Table 7.
See supra Table 7.
See infra Figure 9.
See infra Figure 9.
See infra Figure 9.
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We further explore the empirical relationship between gubernatorial party and
ideology in Table 8 by estimating negative binomial regression models.336 Here, the
unit of analysis is state-year. We include an indicator for whether the governor belongs
to the Democratic Party (Democratic Governor) in the first and second columns, which
amounts to 46% of the observations in the dataset.337 We use Gubernatorial Conservatism in the last two columns.338 Like Presidents, affiliation with the Democratic
Party corresponds to a greater reliance on executive orders related to individual
rights.339 Particularly, Democratic governors increase their use of rights and rightsexpanding orders by 69% and 73%, respectively.340 Gubernatorial Conservatism,
similarly, decreases these directives by 34–37%. Even when including additional variables in Table 9,341 we find that the relationship between gubernatorial preferences
and unilateral policymaking affecting rights still holds strongly.342 Additionally, executive orders specifically related to civil rights occur more frequently under Democratic
and liberal governors.343
Table 8: Gubernatorial Individual Rights Executive Orders, Party, and
Ideology (No Controls)

Democratic
Governor
Gubernatorial
Conservatism
States Fixed
Effects
Constant

(1) All Rights
0.53 (0.10)***

YES

(2) Expands
0.55 (0.10)***

YES

(3) All Rights

(4) Expands

-0.45 (0.16)***

-0.47
(0.16)***

YES

YES

-1.10
-0.81 (0.41)**
-0.80 (0.41)*
(0.29)***
N
1,559
1,559
601
601
Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by
state-year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
336

-1.09 (0.29)***

See infra Table 8.
See infra Table 8.
338
We use Adam Bonica’s ideal estimates for governor ideology, based on campaign contributions. See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367,
368–69 (2013). Positive (negative) values correspond to greater conservatism (liberalism).
339
See infra Table 8.
340
Given the rarity of executive orders that retract rights, we omit them in the analysis.
341
See discussion infra notes 392–98 for a description of the control variables.
342
See infra Table 9.
343
See infra Table 9.
337
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Beyond preferences, the governor’s gender and race could also impact her use
of these directives, given the established link between descriptive and substantive representation.344 Figure 10 shows the annual average number of rights executive orders
by gender.345 Contrary to expectations, female governors actually issued fewer individual rights (0.37) and civil rights (0.31) executive orders per year than their male
counterparts (0.53 and 0.45, respectively).346 We find similarly counterintuitive
effects when exploring the average number of rights-related orders by the race of the
governor in Figure 11.347 White governors employed an average of 0.52 individual
rights and 0.44 civil rights executive orders per year, while non-white chief executives
signed an average of 0.43 individual and 0.38 civil rights orders.348 Overall, female and
minority governors do not appear to unilaterally promote substantive representation.349
Table 9: Gubernatorial Individual Rights Executive Orders,
Party, and Ideology (Controls)

Democratic
Governor

(1) All Rights

(2) Expands

0.38 (0.10)***

0.40 (0.11)***

Gubernatorial
Conservatism

(3) All Rights

(4) Expands

-0.28 (0.16)*

-0.30 (0.16)*

Female Governor

-0.24 (0.21)

-0.26 (0.21)

-0.28 (0.30)

-0.30 (0.31)

Non-White
Governor

-0.33 (0.28)

-0.39 (0.27)

0.47 (0.38)

0.34 (0.48)

Public
Conservatism

0.51 (0.25)**

0.57 (0.26)**

0.78 (0.37)**

0.82 (0.37)**

Divided
Government

0.09 (0.11)

0.09 (0.11)

-0.52 (0.18)***

-0.50
(0.18)***

Veto Proof

-0.52 (0.23)**

-0.51 (0.23)**

0.06 (0.42)

0.07 (0.43)

Election Year

-0.36 (0.12)***

-0.36 (0.12)***

-0.23 (0.18)

-0.25 (0.18)

Previous Election
Percent

-0.01 (0.01)

-0.01 (0.01)

-0.01 (0.01)

-0.01 (0.02)

Term Limited

-0.30 (0.14)**

-0.33 (0.14)**

0.01 (0.20)

-0.04 (0.20)

Governor Power

0.16 (0.19)

0.20 (0.19)

-0.64 (0.72)

-0.68 (0.72)

Leg. Staff

0.84 (0.30)***

0.84 (0.30)***

0.29 (0.65)

0.28 (0.66)

344
345
346
347
348
349

See infra Table 9.
See infra Figure 10.
See infra Figure 10.
See infra Figure 11.
See infra Figure 11.
See infra Figures 10–11.
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(1) All Rights

(2) Expands

(3) All Rights

(4) Expands

Leg. Salary

-0.29 (0.23)

-0.27 (0.23)

0.27 (0.12)**

0.28 (0.12)**

Unemployment

0.03 (0.03)

0.03 (0.03)

-0.09 (0.05)*

-0.08 (0.05)*

States Fixed
Effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Constant

-4.41 (2.75)

-4.677 (2.75)*

-1.68 (4.90)

-1.62 (4.91)

N

1,290

1,290

548

548

Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by
state-year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure 11: Gubernatorial Rights Executive Orders by Race

The analysis in Table 9 confirms these descriptive patterns.350 Female Governor
and Non-White Governor both have an insignificant coefficient, suggesting that
these governors do not more actively pursue rights policies through unilateral
actions as compared to their male and white counterparts.351 These relationships are
also insignificant when examining civil rights orders in Table 10 (columns 1 and 2).352
Next, we investigate whether Democratic governors who are also from one of these
under-represented groups are more likely to unilaterally expand civil rights policies
by interacting Democratic Governor with Female Governor (column 3) and NonWhite Governor (column 4).353 The latter interaction is insignificant, suggesting that
non-white Democratic governors do not engage with more civil rights orders than
other governors.354
Table 10: Gubernatorial Civil Rights Executive Orders and Salience
(1)
Democratic Governor

(2)

0.42 (0.11)***

Gubernatorial

-0.33

Conservatism

(0.18)*

350
351
352
353
354

See supra Table 9.
See supra Table 9.
See infra Table 10.
See infra Table 10.
See infra Table 10.

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.47

0.44

0.23

(0.34)

(0.11)***

(0.20)
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Female Governor

-0.24 (0.24)

(2)
-0.34 (0.34)

Dem Gov. x Female

(4)

-0.23

(0.34)

(0.24)

(0.40)***
-0.30 (0.28)

0.04 (0.58)

-0.41

-0.28

-0.27

(0.27)

(0.23)

(0.28)

Dem Gov. x Non-

-0.80

White Gov.

(0.74)

MIP

(5)

0.47
-1.15

Gov.
Non-White Governor

(3)
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5.77 (2.61)**

3.08 (4.22)

5.62

5.67

3.29

(2.62)**

(2.61)**

(3.70)

Dem Gov. x MIP

5.80
(4.99)

Public Conservatism

0.42 (0.27)

0.43 (0.39)

Divided Government

0.09 (0.12)

-0.41
(0.20)**

Veto Proof

0.44

(0.27)*

(0.27)

(0.27)

0.12

0.10

0.09

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.12)

-0.58

-0.57

-0.60

(0.21)***

(0.21)***

-0.42

-0.44

-0.43

-0.43

(0.20)***

(0.13)***

(0.13)***

(0.13)***

-0.01 (0.01)

-0.01 (0.02)

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Term Limited

-0.37 (0.15)**

-0.10 (0.24)

-0.37

-0.36

-0.37

(0.15)**

(0.15)**

(0.16)**

Governor Power

0.21 (0.20)

-0.53 (0.73)

0.21

0.20

0.19

(0.21)

(0.20)

(0.20)

Previous Election

-0.43 (0.13)***

-0.11 (0.35)

0.42

(0.21)***
Election Year

-0.58 (0.21)***

0.46

Percent

Leg. Staff
Leg. Salary
Unemployment

0.76 (0.32)**
-0.27 (0.19)
0.04 (0.03)

0.27 (0.68)
0.09 (0.28)
-0.08 (0.05)

0.67

0.76

0.76

(0.31)

(0.32)**

(0.32)**

-0.23

-0.24

-0.25

(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.19)

0.04

0.04

0.04

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

States Fixed Effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Constant

-4.71 (2.75)

-1.28 (5.30)

-4.29

-4.80

-4.64

(2.71)

(2.74)*

(2.77)*

N

1,290

548

1,290

548

1,290

Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by state-year
in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Interestingly, we find a significant interactive relationship between gubernatorial
gender and party, but in another unexpected way.355 We depict the marginal effects
of Democratic Governor and Female Governor in Figure 12.356 Panel (a) shows the
marginal effects of being a female governor on the estimated number of rights-related
executive orders issued per year for both Republican governors and Democratic
governors.357 Conversely, panel (b) depicts the marginal effects of being a female
governor on rights-related orders for male versus female governors.358 The effect of
gender is most pronounced for Democratic governors but negatively so. Specifically,
gender does not influence unilateralism for Republicans, but being female significantly decreases these orders under Democrats. Similarly, Democratic governors do
not impact directives for men but strongly depresses them under female administrations. Taken together, being both a woman and a Democrat produces the strongest
negative effects on unilateralism related to individual rights.
Similar to the federal level, public conservatism seems to significantly impact
rights-related gubernatorial directives. Here, we measure the ideology of the public
by aggregated ANES survey data by state-year. As shown in Table 9, governors tend
to issue more rights-related executive orders when their states are more conservative, perhaps in an effort to preserve individual rights in moments they are perceived
to be most unsafe.359 In particular, executive orders pertaining to rights grow by
46–127% for every standard deviation increase in public conservatism.
Figure 12: Marginal Effects of Democratic Governor and Female Governor

355
356
357
358
359

See supra Table 10.
See infra Figure 12.
See infra Figure 12.
See infra Figure 12.
See supra Table 9.
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(3)

(4)

Controls

YES

YES

YES

YES

States Fixed Effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Constant

28.03 (10.48)***

23.32 (9.76)**

23.67 (10.26)**

26.56 (10.17)***

N

480

479

480

480

Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by state-year in
parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

When analyzing approval among liberals, conservatives, and moderates separately
(columns 2–4), we discover differential effects.369 In particular, governors employ
more rights-related orders when liberals and moderates in their state have a more
favorable opinion of them but fewer when conservative approval is high.370 Overall,
these results suggest that governors are most sensitive to performance evaluations to
those portions of the electorate who care most about rights or who are more critical
for their electoral support.371
Table 12: Gubernatorial Civil Rights Executive Orders and
Gubernatorial Approval
(1)
Gubernatorial Approval

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.24 (0.95)

Liberal Approval

1.47 (0.39)***

Conservative Approval

-1.53 (0.46)***

Moderate Approval

1.15 (0.58)**

Controls

YES

YES

YES

YES

States Fixed Effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Constant

25.58 (9.70)***

20.25 (8.78)**

17.83 (9.03)**

24.53 (9.42)***

N

480

479

480

480

Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by state-year in
parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Next, we provide a more precise measure of public opinion by examining sentiments toward certain groups.372 We use the same feeling thermometers as before, but

369
370
371
372

See supra Table 11 and infra Table 12.
See supra Table 11 and infra Table 12.
See supra Table 11 and infra Table 12.
See infra Table 13.
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we aggregate them by the respondent’s state and year.373 Similar to the federal level,
governors appear to be responsive to public feelings towards African Americans,
advancing more executive orders related to civil rights as their states’ residents report more favorable opinions of that group.374 In particular, for every one-point
increase in the Black feeling thermometer, governors issue 3% more executive
orders.375 This relationship does not hold across all groups of feeling thermometers,
however.376 Affect for women and Hispanics is not impactful for executive orders
on civil rights, while increased warmth towards the LGBT community actually
appears to decrease these directives.377 In the case of the latter, governors may be
relying on unilateralism to protect LGBT rights when they are the most exposed to
public threats.378
Table 13: Gubernatorial Civil Rights Executive Orders and
Feeling Thermometers

Black FT
Women FT
Hispanic FT
LGBT FT

(1)
0.03 (0.01)**

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.01 (0.01)
-0.01 (0.01)
-0.01 (0.01)*

Controls
YES
YES
YES
YES
States Fixed Effects YES
YES
YES
YES
Constant
-6.76 (2.99)** -5.04 (2.82)*
-3.50 (3.02) -2.14 (3.48)
N
1,129
1,252
1,255
1,108
Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by
state-year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Finally, we assess how federalism might impact state executive orders.379 Are
governors responsive to federal politics when issuing rights-related orders? To
answer this question, we first turn to the policy preferences of the President as a proxy
373
374
375
376
377
378
379

See infra Table 13.
See infra Table 13.
See infra Table 13.
See infra Table 13.
See infra Table 13.
See infra Table 13; see also sources cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 13.
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for when they should more actively advance individual rights. Figure 13 shows the
average number of rights-related orders issued by governors based on the party of
the President.380 Governors deployed more individual and civil rights executive orders
under Republican Presidents (0.56 and 0.48 per year), as compared to Democratic
ones (0.46 and 0.39 per year).381 These numbers provide some suggestive evidence
that governors unilaterally act to guard rights amid Republican adversaries in the
White House.
Figure 13: Gubernatorial Rights Executive Orders by Presidential Party

To further evaluate this relationship, we once again turn to regression analyses.
We include variables for the current President’s party and ideology in Table 14 (all
individual rights orders) and Table 15 (civil rights orders).382 We find inconsistent
results and the coefficients are mostly non-significant.383 In some specifications,
presidential conservatism decreases rights-related executive orders issued at the state
level.384 Elsewhere, we find Republican presidencies increase the use of civil rights
orders.385 We suspect, however, that these effects are conditional on salience.
380
381
382
383
384
385

See infra Figure 13.
See infra Figure 13.
See infra Tables 14–15.
See infra Tables 14–15.
See infra Tables 14–15.
See infra Tables 14–15.
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Table 14: Gubernatorial Rights Executive Orders and Federalism

Democratic
President
Presidential
Conservatism
Controls

(1)
-0.12 (0.10)

(2)

(3)
0.14 (0.11)

0.04 (0.07)

NO

NO

(4)

-0.16 (0.08)*

YES

YES

States Fixed
YES
YES
YES
YES
Effects
Constant
-0.80 (0.32)*
-0.82 (0.32)** -5.41 (2.83)*
-5.48 (2.83)*
N
1,559
1,473
1,290
1,290
Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by
state-year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 15: Gubernatorial Civil Rights Executive Orders and Federalism

Democratic
President
Presidential
Conservatism

(1)
-0.19 (0.10)*

(2)

0.10 (0.08)

(3)
-0.13 (0.13)

(4)

0.05 (0.11)

Controls
NO
NO
YES
YES
States Fixed
YES
YES
YES
YES
Effects
Constant
-1.06 (0.38)*** -1.12 (0.38)***
-4.29 (2.73)
-4.58 (2.73)*
N
1,559
1,473
1,290
1,290
Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by
state-year in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

To test this expectation, we cross Democratic President with Public Salience
(columns 1 and 2) and Presidential Salience (columns 3 and 4) in Table 16.386 We
find significant interaction effects, which we graphically depict in Figures 14 and
386

See infra Table 16.
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15.387 These figures show the marginal effects of Democratic Presidents on gubernatorial executive orders related to civil rights when varying public salience (Figure
14) and presidential salience (Figure 15).388 Across both Figures, there is no difference in state executive order use under Democratic and Republican administrations.389 Yet this effect becomes negative and statistically significant as salience
increases.390 That is, Democratic Presidents correspond to fewer gubernatorial
executive orders on civil rights but only when the issue is salient to the public and
the President.391 Altogether, these findings suggest that governors pursue fewer
unilateral actions to protect civil rights when these rights are less in danger, under
potentially supportive Democratic Presidents likely to act on a salient issue. Republican presidencies, on the other hand, could prove to be more harmful to rights and are
thus when governors take action.
Table 16: Gubernatorial Civil Rights Executive Orders,
Federalism, and Salience
(1)

(2)

Democratic President

0.03 (0.18)

0.24 (0.23)

Public Salience

8.65 (3.40)**

16.01 (5.58)***

Presidential Salience
Democratic President x

-7.33 (4.60)

(3)

(4)

0.25 (0.21)

0.06 (0.23)

0.13 (0.08)

0.07 (0.08)

-0.25 (0.10)**

-0.11 (0.11)

-12.97 (6.81)*

Public Salience
Democratic President x
Presidential Salience
Controls

NO

YES

NO

YES

States Fixed Effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Constant

-1.34 (0.40)***

-4.06 (2.74)

-1.29 (0.40)***

-4.13 (2.70)

N

1,559

1,290

1,559

1,290

Coefficients from negative binomial regression, with robust standard errors clustered by state-year
in parenthesis.
Two tailed tests, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

387
388
389
390
391

See infra Figures 14–15.
See infra Figures 14–15.
See infra Figures 14–15.
See infra Figures 14–15.
See infra Figures 14–15.
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Figure 14: Marginal Effects of Democratic President by Public Salience
(State Civil Rights Executive Orders)

Figure 15: Marginal Effects of Democratic President by Presidential
Salience (State Civil Rights Executive Orders)
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Other findings emerge when analyzing the effects of the control variables. Consistent with previous theories, governors issue fewer rights-related orders when facing
legislative opposition, particularly under divided government and veto-proof majorities.392 They consistently rely less on such unilateralism during gubernatorial election
years,393 suggesting a desire to avoid potentially controversial policies when the
stakes are high. Similar to Presidents, governors employ fewer rights-related executive orders in their final year of office, perhaps navigating policymaking carefully
in order to protect their legacies or prospects for higher office.394 When legislatures
are high in institutional capacity, as measured by staff and salary, unilateral activity
on individual rights spikes.395 Though surprising, this relationship could depend on
governor-legislature alignment.396 Finally, governors issue fewer executive orders
when state unemployment is high—when their political capital might be lower.397
This relationship, however, is not consistently statistically significant across these
models—which means this trend is not constantly appearing in these data.398 Even
392

Divided Government is coded as 1 if the governor and either legislative chamber are
from opposing political parties and 0 otherwise. Veto Proof is coded as 1 if the legislature
has a veto-proof majority and 0 otherwise. Both variables are collected from the Klarner
dataset. See, e.g., Carl Klarner, The Measurement of the Partisan Balance of State Government, 3 STATE POL.&POL’Y Q. 309, 312–16 (2003); Carl Klarner, State Partisan Balance Data,
1937–2011, HARV. DATAVERSE (2013), https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persis
tentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/LZHMG3 [https://perma.cc/7SNL-2GRA].
393
Election Year is measured as 1 in a gubernatorial election year in that state and 0
otherwise. For this data, see Carl Klarner, Governors Dataset, HARV. DATAVERSE (2003),
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/PQ0Y1N [https://
perma.cc/BB35-AGAQ].
394
Term Limited is coded as 1 if the governor is in her last year in office and cannot run
for reelection and 0 otherwise. See id.
395
Legislative Staff is the logged number of total staffers per state-year. This data is
collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures and is linearly interpolated to
fill in missing years. Size of State Legislative Staff, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/staff-change-chart-1979-1988-1996
-2003-2009.aspx [https://perma.cc/99WY-LUYR] (Oct. 2, 2018). Legislative Salary is the
logged salary of state legislators, in 2018 dollars. 2018 Legislator Compensation Information,
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures
/legislator-compensation-2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/YAX2-S4MY] (Apr. 16, 2018).
396
See, e.g., Barber et al., supra note 199, at 535; cf. Bolton & Thrower, supra note 198,
at 649–50.
397
Annual state unemployment rates are collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See
Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/lau/
[https://perma.cc/23U8-JYBQ].
398
We use a modified version of the Beyle Index to measure Governor Power, based on
four indices: gubernatorial tenure potential, budgetary power, appointment power, and veto
power. See Thad Beyle, The Governor’s Formal Powers: A View from the Governor’s Chair,
28 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 540, 540–45 (1968). We use linear interpolation to fill in the gaps between available years (1980, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007).
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when controlling for these alternative explanations for unilateral policymaking, our
results largely reveal that chief executives are motivated by party, ideology, public
opinion, and federalism when deciding when to unilaterally dictate policies on
individual rights.
CONCLUSION
Individual rights are traditionally thought to be protected by the U.S. Bill of Rights,
enshrined in state constitutions, and advanced through landmark legislation such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.399 Yet there is another forceful, but understudied, impetus for
individual rights: executive unilateralism.400 Chief executives across the U.S. federal
system have the power to unilaterally guide executive branch implementation with
the stroke of a pen.401 And these actions do not require the direct assent of legislatures
or the judiciary.402 In this manner, Presidents and governors alike can shape public
policies in ways that profoundly impact citizens’ rights throughout the country.403
Why, and when, do Presidents and governors issue directives affecting the rights
of individuals? In this Article, we examined all unilateral directives related to individual rights issued by Presidents and state governors between 1981 and 2018 to
answer this question. We conclude that partisanship and ideology largely drive these
decisions.404 Presidents and governors who belong to the Democratic Party issue more
directives pertaining to individual rights, on average, than their Republican counterparts.405 Such behavior largely aligns with the traditional principles of the Democratic
Party.406 In their 2020 national platform, the party affirmed that:
Democrats will protect and promote the equal rights of all our
citizens—women, LGBTQ+ people, religious minorities, people
with disabilities, Native Americans, and all who have been discriminated against in too many ways and for too many generations.
We commit ourselves to the vision articulated by Frederick
Douglass of “a Government founded upon justice, and recognizing the equal rights of all.”407
399

See supra text accompanying notes 213–23.
See supra text accompanying notes 45, 48–50; CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 41, at 3–4.
401
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
402
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
403
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
404
See supra Parts IV–V.
405
See supra Parts IV–V.
406
See 2020 Democratic Party Platform, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM. 6 (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/08/2020-Democratic-Party-Plat
form.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8UF-H47S].
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Id.
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Even within the Democratic Party, we likewise find that liberal chief executives
issue more rights-related directives.408 Thus, personal beliefs about policy strongly
drive executive choices to protect individual rights through unilateral action.409 Public
opinion is also influential in these decisions.410 In general, Presidents and governors
with higher public approval tend to issue more unilateral directives related to
individual rights.411 At the state level, this relationship is mostly driven by the liberal
and moderate electorate, likely because they care most about individual rights.412
High salience and positive feelings towards African Americans strongly motivate
directives expanding civil rights, in both federal and state contexts.413
Though the vast majority of these directives are aimed at protecting or expanding
individual rights, there are some that seek to restrict these rights.414 As mentioned
in the Introduction, Trump issued several unilateral directives curbing the rights of
transgender individuals and immigrants.415 This raises the question of whether chief
executives should have free reign in unilaterally impacting individual rights, particularly in a negative manner.
Traditionally, political science scholars have argued that legislatures can serve
to constrain executive power.416 Legislatures can retaliate against Presidents and governors for unfavorable unilateral actions through means such as passing legislation,
restricting budgets, and increasing oversight hearings.417 Consequently, the empirical
literature finds that chief executives issue fewer unilateral directives under divided
government for fear of legislative retaliation.418 We find little evidence of this dynamic when examining presidential directives related to individual rights; though we
note there could be differential effects when separating out executive orders and memoranda, given the former is much more visible to legislative actors than the latter.
At the state level, we find evidence that governors issue fewer orders related to
individual rights when facing legislatures from the opposing party and those with
veto-proof majorities that can freely sanction the governor through the statutory
process.419 Though it might be comforting to know that governors can be deterred
408

See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
410
See supra notes 186–88.
411
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
412
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
413
See supra notes 307–09, 370–71 and accompanying text.
414
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
415
See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
416
See, e.g., Barber et al., supra note 199, at 535–36; Bolton & Thrower, supra note 198,
at 662; Chiou & Rothenberg, The Elusive Search, supra note 198, at 661–62.
417
See Barber et al., supra note 199, at 524; Bolton & Thrower, supra note 198, at 649;
Chiou & Rothenberg, The Elusive Search, supra note 198, at 666.
418
See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 198, at xv, xvii; Bolton & Thrower, supra note 198, at
651; Chiou & Rothenberg, The Elusive Search, supra note 198, at 666.
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See supra text accompanying note 390.
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from targeting individual rights based on threats from legislative opponents, this
finding also means that governors wanting to safeguard rights will face institutional
impediments, largely based on partisan politics.
Although we find evidence that chief executives may be responsive to public
opinion when unilaterally protecting against individual rights, this raises concerns
about the tyranny of the majority. That is, Presidents or governors may only be
incentivized to protect individual rights when it is popular amongst the majority of
the public. But what about minority opinion? This is a particularly relevant concern
for guarding groups finding themselves on the margins of society. Should government officials have a duty to protect vulnerable populations, even when it is unpopular? We do find some evidence that governors and Presidents might protect these
populations in some cases.420 For instance, they tend to issue more civil rights orders
when feelings towards women and LGBT individuals are cold, but this finding does
not translate across all under-represented groups.421 We also find evidence that more
rights-related orders are issued in response to growing public conservatism, particularly in the states, which might indicate a more hostile environment for the protection of these groups.422 Future research should more closely examine the conditions
under which executives lead or are led by the public when dictating rights policies.
One reassuring finding from our empirical study might be that state governors
seem to more actively promote individual rights when these rights are likely to be
targeted at the federal level.423 Specifically, they issue more rights-related directives
when the President is conservative or a Republican.424 These are the times when
individual rights are the most vulnerable, either due to inaction or specific policies
retracting rights.425 Taken together, our evidence suggests that many governors are
answering the call to decide policies related to individual rights at the state level, as
broadcast by the Trump administration.426
Yet, this call may be a double-edged sword. Though states are in the position to
advance individual rights when the federal government refuses to do so, they likewise
can choose to remain inactive or even actively hostile towards these rights.427 Though
states are often viewed as decisive policy laboratories, we see that personal preferences, partisanship, ideology, public opinion, and institutional barriers can all prevent
these governments from expanding rights.428
420

See supra text accompanying note 376.
See supra text accompanying notes 374–76.
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See supra Table 9.
423
See supra text accompanying notes 378–90 (regarding federalism).
424
See supra text accompanying notes 381–83.
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This is possible because states are laboratories of constitutional process. See New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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So, what happens when both Presidents and governors refuse to protect individual
rights? The courts have long been a vehicle by which interested persons and groups
can challenge governmental policies that infringe upon individual rights.429 Several
of President Trump’s unilateral directives related to transgender rights and immigration, for instance, have been the subject of frequent litigation during his term.430
Moreover, many interest groups have the resources, power, and public platforms to
pressure chief executives and other governmental actors to actively advance policies
that are friendly to individual rights.431 Future research should examine how both
courts and interest groups might be crucial in nudging executive actors towards
unilaterally acting on individual rights, one way or another.
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